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INTRODUCTION
Today our employment law provides workers with far more protection
than once existed with respect to hiring, firing, salary, and workplace condi-
tions. For example, due to complex interactions between social movements,3
lawmaking, and courts’ legal interpretations, advances have been made to
eradicate sexual harassment, and better protections are now afforded to relig-
ious, racial, and ethnic minorities; women; LGBTQ employees, as well as to
older and disabled persons. One only needs to watch movies or television
shows portraying society in the 1950s or 1960s to be reminded how much
the working world has changed in a lifetime. In contrast to those shows,
featuring white working dads and stay-at-home moms,4 television shows to-
day regularly feature female executives, stay-at-home dads, and diversity of
many types.5
Despite these gains, continued progress6 towards justice is currently in
jeopardy due to companies’ imposition of mandatory arbitration7 on their
3 There is no single definition of “social movement.” Tomiko Brown-Nagin defines “so-
cial movements” from a progressive political perspective as “politically insurgent and par-
ticipatory campaigns for relief from socioeconomic crisis or the redistribution of social,
political, and economic capital.” Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1439 (2005) (citation omit-
ted). However, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres emphasize that social movements can derive
from either the political right or left. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes
Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2751 (2014)
(mentioning social movements pertaining to abolition, women’s suffrage, property rights, and
gun rights).
4 For example, the television series “Mad Men” portrays life in the advertising world in
the 1960s, when white men made the money, white women had babies and worked as secretar-
ies, and minorities were largely invisible. Mad Men (AMC television series 2007–2015). Or,
similarly, the television series “Good Girls Revolt” gives a glimpse into the news room of the
1960s, when men were reporters and women (girls) were research assistants. Good Girls Re-
volt (Amazon Video 2015–2016); see also LYNN POVICH, THE GOOD GIRLS REVOLT: HOW THE
WOMEN OF NEWSWEEK SUED THEIR BOSSES AND CHANGED THE WORKPLACE (2012).
5 See, e.g., Here and Now (HBO Entertainment 2018) (featuring adopted siblings from
Liberia, Colombia and Vietnam, gay and gender-fluid characters, a stay-at-home dad, and an
executive mom); Transparent (Amazon Video 2014–2017) (starring a transgender parent);
Brooklyn Nine-Nine (Universal Television 2013–2018) (featuring the struggles and triumphs of
an openly gay Black police captain in an interracial same-sex marriage); The Fosters (Disney-
ABC Domestic Television 2013–2018) (depicting the lives of a likable biracial lesbian couple
with four adopted children).
6 This author appreciates that she is making a value judgment when she calls these
changes “progress,” and “better,” and she understands that some might disagree with her
judgment. She is taking this perspective for granted rather than trying to convince readers that
these advances are good. Of course, she is not so naı¨ve as to believe that judicial interpreta-
tions and reinterpretations only advance rather than impede the cause of greater justice. See
infra Part I. Indeed, the most recent Supreme Court appointment suggests that we may soon be
moving backwards for a time in terms of progressive values at the federal level.
7 “Mandatory arbitration” refers to employers’ use of form contracts that contain provi-
sions requiring employees to agree to arbitrate rather than litigate future disputes. By contrast,
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employees.8 By denying their employees access to court, companies are
causing employment law to stultify. This impacts all employees, but particu-
larly harms the most vulnerable and oppressed members of our society for
whom legal evolution is most important.
In recent years, there has been much debate about the nature of the
interplay between social movements, lawmaking, and legal interpretation.
Discouraged by the many social and economic disparities that remain in the
United States despite new legislation and important court decisions, some
commentators argue that progressives should expend more energy on politi-
cal organizing and social activism and less on litigation and lobbying.9 Other
scholars are more positive towards the potential impact of litigation, con-
tending that there can be an important feedback relationship between social
movements, judicial interpretations, and lawmaking that ultimately advances
all three.10 For example, while recognizing that it is not enough to rely on
arbitration is sometimes entered into knowingly and voluntarily by higher level employees as
well. See infra Part II.A. While voluntary arbitration can also lead to stultification of legal
development, it is less troubling than its mandatory cousin because voluntary arbitration provi-
sions allow employees to choose their desired dispute resolution process.
8 This Article draws a sharp distinction between the “employment” setting, by which it
means the non-unionized workplace, and the “labor” setting, where employees are assisted
and represented by their union. While arbitration often works fairly in the labor setting, this
Article critiques its mandatory imposition in the non-unionized employment setting. See gen-
erally Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2702
(2008) (discussing and ultimately critiquing the traditional distinction between employment
law and labor law).
9 See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007) (summarizing the work of Critical
Legal Scholars and others who argue that progressives’ frequent focus on legislative and judi-
cial reforms, rather than other means of social action, has impeded rather than aided the cause
of justice). This Law Review hosted an important conference on this issue twenty years ago.
See Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversations on Progressive Social Change, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285, 285–88 (1996). For an example of its content, see, for example Martha
Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287, 289 (1996),
explaining that “[p]olitical lawyers use litigation, legislation, mass media, and social science
research, assessing the consequences of each particular approach by reference to long-term
visions of freedom, equality, and solidarity.” See also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 44–50 (1987) (expressing frustration regard-
ing limited progress to achieve racial justice); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 341 (1991) (asserting, based on empirical re-
search, that it is difficult to achieve meaningful social change through the courts); DEAN
SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, & THE LIMITS
OF LAW xvi (2015) (urging “an approach [that] includes law reform work but does not center
it, and instead approaches law reform work with the caution urged by the critical traditions to
which trans politics is indebted and of which it is a part”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475–78 (2001)
(suggesting that “a rule-enforcement approach” is not adequate to resolve modern employ-
ment discrimination).
10 See, e.g., Guinier & Torres, supra note 3, at 2749 (defining “demosprudence” as “the
study of the dynamic equilibrium of power between lawmaking and social movements”); see
also Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 539 (2009); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term – Foreword: Demos-
prudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008). Others have similarly cautioned
against overreliance on an organizing model. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly,
A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 443, 491 (analyzing poten-
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lawyers to protect “discrete and insular minorities,”11 Lani Guinier and Ger-
ald Torres argue that “[l]itigation is an essential tactic for social move-
ments.”12 William Eskridge, who has traced various “identity-based
movements” throughout history, also recognizes that court decisions and so-
cial movements influence one another.13 But Eskridge also urges that “the
judiciary is a necessary safety valve,”14 emphasizing the need for courts to
accommodate both emerging social movements and countermovements to
ensure the “preservation and adaption of a peaceable pluralism.”15
Despite the significant divergences in their normative perspectives, all
these commentators agree on two critically important points. First, while liti-
gation may not be the only or best way to achieve progressive social change,
it is an important means. Even if new laws are passed,16 they do not enforce
tial limits and tensions in relying too heavily on an organizing approach, and pointing out that
“creative litigation and court-ordered remedies have changed many aspects of the social, polit-
ical, and economic landscape”).
11 Guinier & Torres, supra note 3, at 2749 n.27 (quoting the famous phrase from United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)) (“[P]rejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tions of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); see generally JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (spelling out a pro-
posed theory of judicial review that relies on protecting the rights of “discrete and insular
minorities”).
12 Guinier & Torres, supra note 3, at 2756 n.49 (stating, however, that “litigators too often
use state power in service of a principle rather than using principle in service of resistance to
state power or other concentrations of power that undermine democracy”). Other scholars have
made similar suggestions. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT
FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 4–7 (2005) (describing intersections between litigation on behalf of
immigrant workers and union organizing); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
376–405 (1976) (examining historical events leading up to the Brown decision); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Obergefell at the Intersection of Civil Rights and Social Movements, 6 CAL. L. REV.
CIR. 157, 157 (2015) (considering “the distinct ways in which the civil rights and social move-
ments for marriage equality helped give rise to a durable socio-political transformation, as
reflected in the widespread acceptance of the Court’s decision” in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2018)); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1541–44 (2004)
(examining the impact of social movements pre- and post-Brown on the interpretation of that
decision); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 967–72 (1997) (pondering why New Zealand, with laws that
were more accepting of gay rights than the United States, nonetheless felt less gay-friendly to
him than the United States).
13 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 423 (2001); see also Reva B. Siegel & Robert C. Post, Roe
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373–75
(2007) (proposing a model of “democratic constitutionalism” to understand how forces of
public “backlash” help inform constitutional interpretation and urging that such backlash has a
constructive purpose).
14 Eskridge, supra note 13, at 423.
15 Id.
16 In the employment area such new legislation has included Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2006), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq. (2012).
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themselves. Laws are only as potent as they are enforceable.17 Second, social
movements impact not only the steps attorneys take but also the decisions
judges make. Long ago, the Legal Realists18 emphasized that judges are in-
fluenced by the “mores of the day,”19 and more recently Lani Guinier and
Gerald Torres have explained that lawyers and judges both influence and are
influenced by “popular mobilizations.”20 Sol Wachtler took this position fur-
ther, justifying judicial lawmaking by the fact that judges, even more than
legislators, can see close-up how people and entities are impacted by various
legal interpretations.21
However, as scholars have considered the appropriate relationship be-
tween social movements, legislation, and litigation, they have taken for
granted a critically important predicate: the availability of a judicial forum.
If companies can continue to use mandatory arbitration to eradicate access to
court, where judges are potentially influenced by social movements, social
movements will no longer be able to assist the overall progressive trend of
our jurisprudence. While the phenomenon of mandatory employment arbi-
tration is not new, recent Supreme Court opinions have encouraged an even
greater number of employers to use this practice to force employees to take
any disputes to arbitration, rather than to court.22 This Article will consider
this reality and its detrimental implications for the evolution of legal prece-
dent affecting our most vulnerable employees.
For those interested in the relationship between social movements, law-
making, litigation, and mandatory arbitration, the current and powerful
17 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRI-
VATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (discussing the critical enforcement role played by private
litigation in the United States); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (same).
18 For the most famous statement of legal realism, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897), in which Holmes said, “The prophecies of
what courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” See
also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 104 (1921); see also KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24 (1960) (observing that
legal development is affected by the surrounding occasion and epoch, as well as by pressures
of legal doctrine). For a general discussion of legal realism, see Brian Leiter, American Legal
Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson, eds., 2005).
19 CARDOZO, supra note 18; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 96–97 (1982) (explaining that “the legal fabric, and the principles that form it,
are good approximations of one aspect of the popular will, of what a majority in some sense
desires”); LLEWELLYN, supra note 18. By contrast, as many have pointed out, it is not accurate
to say that Legal Realists focused on what judges ate for breakfast! See, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1923 (2004).
20 Guinier & Torres, supra note 3, at 2745.
21 Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990) (“Unlike the legis-
lature, in a conflict of any importance the judiciary issues an opinion which, if it is ‘worth its
salt,’ positions the case in the contextual, historical, and cultural dimensions making up the
legal landscape.”). For a contrary perspective on the propriety of judicial lawmaking, see Rob-
ert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides? The Problem of Judicial Supremacy and
the Interbranch Solution, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1055, 1132 (2006) (critiquing the practice).
22 See infra Parts II.A–B.
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#MeToo movement offers a perfect, albeit depressing, case study.23 While
the #MeToo movement has already exposed many sordid high-profile inci-
dents of alleged harassment, sparked substantial outrage in traditional and
social media, and become a talking point in public events and workplaces
throughout the country, for the most part this outrage has not yet trickled
down to protect ordinary women (and men) in ordinary workplaces. To the
contrary, the law of sexual harassment still has a long way to go to catch up
with the sentiments being expressed in the #MeToo movement.24 In the past,
one might have expected that the new cultural attitudes surrounding sexual
harassment might lead courts to rethink some of their prior restrictive deci-
sions on sexual harassment.25 However, to the extent that employers are us-
ing mandatory arbitration to keep employment disputes out of court, even as
powerful a social force as the #MeToo movement may not produce the pro-
gressive legal changes one might otherwise have expected. What is true of
the #MeToo movement is true of other existing and potential forces for so-
cial change as well, such as social movements that might advocate for
greater diversity, privacy, or income equality. To the extent companies are
permitted to use arbitration to eliminate access to courts, they prevent our
law from evolving to become more just. Mandatory arbitration has appropri-
ately been criticized on many constitutional, statutory and policy grounds,
and indeed this author has been such a critic,26 but the potential of mandatory
arbitration to harm disempowered persons by stultifying legal development
has not yet received sufficient attention.
The remainder of this Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will
discuss the important role courts have historically played in reinterpreting
existing texts to move towards greater justice. While the Article will focus
on employment law, it will also provide examples of judicial reinterpretation
from other contexts to demonstrate the impact of social movements on judi-
cial decisions. Part II will then summarize employers’ increasing imposition
23 See generally L. Camille He´bert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal
Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (forthcoming 2018), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236309, archived at https://perma.cc/N6KR-
RLS7.
24 See infra Part III.B.
25 See id. for a discussion of the disconnect between assumptions of the #MeToo move-
ment and existing case law.
26 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631 (2005) (pointing out that private companies should not be free to insulate them-
selves from liability); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers are
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
1309 (2015) (critiquing the impact of mandatory arbitration on employees); Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 669 (2001) (arguing that mandatory arbitration often impinges
on the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q.
637 (1996) (contending that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of mandatory binding arbitra-
tion is erroneous as a matter of statutory interpretation and undesirable as a matter of public
policy).
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of mandatory arbitration clauses and explore how this phenomenon has se-
verely limited employees’ access to court, thereby impeding progressive de-
velopment of law in the employment context. Part III will then discuss the
#MeToo social movement as a case study of how the imposition of
mandatory arbitration stymies the progressive evolution of law. It will show
that while this social movement has been powerful, employers’ use of arbi-
tration clauses in the employment setting has and will significantly prevent
courts from reevaluating the law of sexual harassment, thereby blocking pro-
gress that might otherwise have occurred. Finally, Part IV will call for legis-
lative reform. Legislation has already been introduced in Congress that
would limit the use of mandatory arbitration to varying degrees, and one can
hope that the arguments set out in this Article will provide greater impetus to
its passage.
I. COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS AND REINTERPRETATIONS (OFTEN)
BRING GREATER JUSTICE
Judicial interpretations evolve, often but certainly not inevitably, in a
way that reflects increasingly progressive societal values. Such rulings are
particularly important for the least powerful groups within our society—
such as  women, racial or ethnic minorities, poor persons, undocumented
immigrants, LGBTQ persons, elderly persons, and the disabled. For exam-
ple, while the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson held in 1896 that racially
segregated facilities could be permissible if “equal, but separate,”27 nearly
sixty years later the Court unanimously held in Brown v. Board of Education
that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”28 This rever-
sal did not result from a change in the underlying Constitutional provisions,29
but instead from a new judicial interpretation of those provisions. This judi-
cial reinterpretation was surely influenced by social movements in support
of racial justice.30 Similarly, whereas the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick31
found in 1986 that a ban on homosexual sodomy did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court concluded just
27 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547 (1896).
28 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
29 Both Plessy and Brown were interpreting the same Fourteenth Amendment. By contrast,
the Supreme Court’s infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1857), that
“a negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the United States] and sold as slaves,” could
never be a citizen of the United States pursuant to the Constitution, was effectively reversed
through ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in 1868 (granting citi-
zenship to all persons born in the United States).
30 See KLUGER, supra note 12 (discussing social and political movements leading up to
Brown).
31 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (famously stating that the Constitution did not confer “a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”).
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the opposite in Lawrence v. Texas32 in 2003. Again, the new decision re-
flected judicial reinterpretation of existing language, rather than passage of
new law. And again, the decision was responsive to a powerful LGBT
movement.33 In Lawrence, the Court explained that the Constitution protects
“personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, [and] child rearing,”34 and that homosexuals, like others,
“may seek autonomy for these purposes.”35 Most recently the Court ex-
pressly reversed its infamous decision in Korematsu v. United States,36 now
stating that decision was “gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been
overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law
under the Constitution.’” 37
In several notable cases in the employment arena, courts have similarly
enunciated new interpretations of existing statutes to provide employees
with additional rights. The primary federal law protecting employees from
discrimination is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 The key lan-
guage of the statute is quite simple, stating:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .39
Although the explicit language of the statute does not apply to unconscious
discrimination, sexual harassment, or the rights of LGBT persons, courts
have, over time, interpreted Title VII to cover these matters and many
more.40
One early expansive judicial interpretation of Title VII was Griggs v.
Duke Power.41 In that 1971 case, the Supreme Court was asked to address
whether Title VII prohibited an employer from requiring a high school edu-
cation or asking employees to pass a general intelligence test in order to be
32 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled.”).
33 See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE STRUG-
GLE (2015) (recounting history of LGBT movement both before and after Bowers and
Lawrence).
34 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
35 Id.
36 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality
of the executive order that ordered Japanese-Americans into internment camps during World
War II).
37 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248
(Jackson, J., dissenting)). Granted, the new Trump decision allows much of the odious racial
profiling that made the Korematsu decision so ignominious.
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964).
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
40 See infra notes 41–88 and accompanying text.
41 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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hired into the better-paying departments.42 Such a requirement did not ex-
plicitly discriminate on the basis of race, and plaintiffs could not prove that
the requirements were deliberately adopted in order to disadvantage Black
persons or others,43 but plaintiffs claimed that the requirements had a racially
discriminatory impact and ought to be proscribed.44 The Court found that
plaintiffs could prove a violation of Title VII absent proof of discriminatory
intent so long as the challenged practices had a “disparate impact.”45 It ex-
plained that because the goal of Congress was “to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees,”46
even tests that are neutral on their face or neutral in terms of intent “cannot
be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discrimina-
tory employment practices.”47 Thus, recognizing that the black plaintiffs had
“long received inferior education in segregated schools,”48 the Court found
that mere apparent equality of opportunity was insufficient, and that prac-
tices must be non-discriminatory not only in form but also in operation.49
Commentator William Eskridge finds that Griggs is best understood in polit-
ical terms:
Griggs is explicable neither as an exercise in legal analysis nor as
an effort by the Justices to read their own values into the statute.
Instead, it reflected an emerging political consensus in Washing-
ton, D.C., that Title VII would be a dead letter unless regulators
and judges could examine employment practices that had discrimi-
natory impacts.50
This Supreme Court decision gave rise to an entirely new line of cases that
further developed disparate impact protections in employment law.51
A few years after Griggs, the Supreme Court addressed another criti-
cally important lacuna in federal employment discrimination law: whether
42 Id. at 426–27.
43 Id. at 432.
44 Id.
45 See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 953–67 (2005).
46 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30.
47 Id. at 430.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 431 (stating that “tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide
equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the
fox.”). The Court explained that “[t]he touchstone is business necessity,” meaning that “[i]f
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.” Id.
50 Eskridge, supra note 13, at 495.
51 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION 167–229 (9th ed. 2017). See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972) (telling the story, from a litigation perspective, of how advocates
convinced the Supreme Court to adopt a new definition of discrimination).
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and how Title VII regulates sexual harassment. The Court’s decisions on
gender issues can be considered in the context of ongoing social and politi-
cal activism pushing for feminism and women’s rights.52 Prior to the Court’s
unanimous ruling in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,53 it was unclear
whether Title VII targeted only “economic” or “tangible” discrimination
such as terminations, refusals to hire, or pay disparities.54 In that case,
Michelle Vinson, a teller-trainee at a bank, brought a different kind of claim.
She alleged that her supervisor coerced her to have sexual relations with him
forty or fifty times over a three year period,55 touched her in public, exposed
himself to her, and even raped her,56 thereby creating a “hostile work envi-
ronment.”57 The question for the Supreme Court was whether—assuming
these claims could be proven—such conduct would violate Title VII.58 The
Justices held in 1986 that such claims were indeed cognizable under Title
VII,59 once again creating an entirely new line of jurisprudence.60
52 See, e.g., ESTELLE B. FRIEDMAN, NO TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND
THE FUTURE OF WOMEN (2007) (placing United States’ women’s movement in an international
and interdisciplinary context). See also CATHERINE MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS (2017)
(arguing that small actions taken by social and political movements have resulted in major
systemic changes in the legal regimes governing women).
53 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
54 The defendant argued that even if sexual harassment could constitute gender discrimina-
tion, it violated Title VII only when the purported victim suffered a tangible economic loss.
See id. at 64. As Professor Vicki Schultz has explained, women lost some of the early sexual
harassment claims because courts tended to reason that the women’s adverse treatment was not
“because of sex,” as provided in Title VII, but rather because the women refused to engage in
sexual relationships with their supervisors. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harass-
ment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1701–02 (1998). See also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 59–77 (1979) (describ-
ing rulings in some of the early Title VII cases).
55 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
56 Id.
57 The court of appeals found that a violation of Title VII could be predicated on two types
of sexual harassment: harassment that conditioned the provision of employment benefits on
giving of sexual favors; and harassment that created a hostile or offensive work environment.
See id. at 62.
58 The district court had denied relief on the grounds that even assuming the facts were as
plaintiff alleged, “that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her contin-
ued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution.” Id. at 61.
Thus, the trial court found plaintiff was not the victim of sexual harassment or sexual discrimi-
nation while employed at the bank. Id.
59 The Court relied on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Guide-
lines defining sexual harassment and pointed out that the language of Title VII did not pre-
clude hostile environment sexual harassment claims. Id. at 64–67 (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (explaining that “[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment’”).
60 A few years later, in Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., the Court further explained that a
hostile environment exists where, based on consideration of various circumstances, the work-
place was objectively hostile to a reasonable person and subjectively hostile to the plaintiff.
510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (noting that the circumstances to be considered include the fre-
quency and severity of the conduct, whether the conduct was physical or verbal, and whether
the conduct interfered with the employee’s work performance). See generally Tristin K. Green,
Was Sexual Harassment Law A Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 152,
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Then, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,61 the Supreme Court considered
another crucial question that was not explicitly addressed in Title VII:
whether decisions based on gender stereotyping could constitute gender dis-
crimination. Ann Hopkins, a senior manager in a top accounting firm, was
denied partnership. She claimed the denial resulted from gender discrimina-
tion evidenced by comments made by some of the male partners,62 and she
presented expert testimony that the partnership selection process “was likely
influenced by sex stereotyping.”63 While it may seem obvious today, it was
far from clear at the time that gender stereotyping should be recognized as a
form of gender discrimination cognizable under Title VII.64 Ruling in plain-
tiff’s favor on this issue, the Court proclaimed in 1989 “we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype with their group.”65 It reasoned:
An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and im-
permissible Catch-22; out of a job if they behave aggressively and
out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.66
While still requiring plaintiffs to prove that the stereotyping was more than
“stray remarks,”67 and that gender played a role in the decision,68 this expan-
sive decision opened the door to a broad array of approaches that employees
153–60 (2018) (discussing the line of hostile work environment sexual harassment cases fol-
lowing Meritor).
61 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
62 Comments in the file from various partners, including Hopkins’s supporters, contained
statements that Hopkins was “macho,” that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that
she should take “a course at charm school,” that some objected to her use of profanity “be-
cause it’s a lady using foul language,” and that Hopkins’ candidacy should be supported be-
cause she “had matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr [sic] to an
authoritative, formidable, but more appealing lady ptr [sic] candidate.” Id. at 235.
63 Id. The witness was Dr. Susan Fiske, who based her comments on her review of the
partner comments in the file but admitted “she could not say with certainty whether any partic-
ular comment was the result of stereotyping.” Id.
64 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself infamously relied on gender discrimination in
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), when it refused to reverse the State of Illinois’s
determination that Mrs. Myra Bradwell should be denied a law license. While the majority
opinion based the denial on its conclusion that the right to be admitted to practice law is not
one of the “privileges and immunities” afforded Constitutional protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment, id. at 139, Justice Bradley concurring based his decision on the “wide
differences in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman,” id. at 141 (Bradley, J.,
concurring in the judgment). He stated in particular: “Man is, or should be, woman’s protector
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator.” Id.
65 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; but cf. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc.,
444 F.3d 1104, 1104–12 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a woman could be fired for failure to
wear makeup because the company’s dress code placed an equal burden on men and women).
66 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
67 Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
68 See id.
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could rely on in future cases.69 William Eskridge partially attributes the
Court’s more expansive approach to sexual harassment “to the normative
consensus that the women’s movement has brought to the issue.”70
Among the important issues left open after Price Waterhouse was the
extent to which Title VII should be interpreted to protect gay, lesbian, and
transgender persons against gender discrimination or sexual harassment.71
For a number of years, it seemed clear that “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’
discrimination applied only to discrimination on the basis of gender and
should not be judicially extended to include sexual orientation or gender
identity.”72 However, drawing on the power of strong social movements,73
LGBTQ employees persisted in seeking the protection of Title VII, eventu-
ally securing more favorable results. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc.,74 the Supreme Court held that a man who claimed that his male
co-workers had sexually harassed him could state a claim under Title VII,75
but did not directly address the question of whether discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation was proscribed by Title VII.76 The Court con-
cluded that even though “male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace
was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
69 Id. at 251–52 (“By focusing on Hopkins’ specific proof . . . we do not suggest a limita-
tion on the possible ways of proving stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment
decision.”).
70 Eskridge, supra note 13, at 497.
71 See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Protecting the Margins: Intersectional Strategies to Protect-
ing Gender Outlaws from Workplace Harassment, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339,
339 (2013) (arguing that “[s]exual harassment jurisprudence is predicated on heteronormative
constructions of desire and power in the workplace” and advocating that laws be revised and
enacted to better protect all workers).
72 DeSantis et al. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting claims of employees at several different companies who claimed they were fired or
forced to quit because they were homosexual). The DeSantis court relied on Holloway v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding a claim of an employee who
alleged discrimination on the ground that she was going through a sex change was not pro-
tected under Title VII) and Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978)
(refusing to apply Title VII to protect claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference).
73 See, e.g., FADERMAN, supra note 33; see generally ERIC MARCUS, GAY HISTORY: THE
HALF-CENTURY FIGHT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY EQUAL RIGHTS (2009).
74 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
75 Oncale, who worked as a roustabout on an eight-man crew of an oil platform in the Gulf
of Mexico, alleged that his co-workers committed numerous sex-related, humiliating actions
against him, and that some physically assaulted him and even threatened him with rape. Id. at
77.
76 The trial court had granted summary judgment to the employer, stating that a male has
“no Title VII cause of action for harassment by male co-workers.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. But
the Supreme Court found that Title VII protects men as well as women, id. at 78, that persons
can claim sex discrimination perpetrated by persons who share their same gender, id. at 79,
and that Title VII covers cases where it can be shown that the workplace was “permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult and that that is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment,” id. at 78 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-1\HLC105.txt unknown Seq: 13 13-MAR-19 10:57
2019] Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress 167
enacted Title VII,”77 such claims could be brought under Title VII so long as
the purported victim could show that “the conduct at issue was not merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted ‘discrimi-
nation . . . because of . . . sex.’” 78
Post-Oncale, as public support for LGBTQ people increased,79 courts
addressed additional questions of whether discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation or transgender status could constitute “discrimination on the
basis of sex” under Title VII.80 Acting en banc, two federal courts of appeals
recently held that it could.81 First, the Seventh Circuit, in Hively v. Ivy Tech,
took “a fresh look at [its] position in light of developments at the Supreme
Court extending over two decades”82 and held that “discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”83 Then, in Zarda
v. Altitude Express, the Second Circuit also found that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is proscribed by Title VII.84 The Second Circuit
noted that it had “previously held that sexual orientation discrimination
claims, including claims that being gay or lesbian constitutes nonconformity
with a gender stereotype, are not cognizable under Title VII,”85 and that
these prior decisions were consistent with “the consensus among our sister
circuits and the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
77 Id. at 79 (observing, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, that “statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed”).
78 Id. at 80–82 (remanding the case so that plaintiff could try to prove that the sexually
assaultive conduct was engaged in “because of sex”). The Court observed that one way to
prove that the conduct was “because of sex” would be to show that the perpetrator was him-
self homosexual, but the Court also recognized that “harassing conduct need not be motivated
by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.” Id. at 79.
79 For a discussion of how LGBTQ activism influenced the fight for gay marriage, see
Goldberg, supra note 12. With regard to social movements fighting on behalf of transgender
persons, see SPADE, supra note 9.
80 The Supreme Court’s Oncale decision had sidestepped these important issues. See 523
U.S. at 75.
81 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017); Zarda
v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018).
82 Hively, 853 F.3d at 340–41 (reversing grant of motion to dismiss claim brought by
Hively, an openly lesbian part-time professor).
83 Id. at 341. The Seventh Circuit also took note of a prior Second Circuit decision in
which a concurring opinion urged the Circuit to rethink the question of whether Title VII
covers sexual orientation claims, emphasizing the changed legal landscape in the past two
decades and pointing to multiple legal arguments that had not previously been considered. Id.
at 342 (citing Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2017)
(Katzmann, C.J., concurring)).
84 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108. Plaintiff Donald Zarda claimed he was fired from his job as a
sky diving instructor because he came out to a client as gay, in order to put her at ease with
how he would be strapped to her during the dive. Id. As the Second Circuit describes his claim,
Zarda alleged “he failed to conform to male sex stereotypes by referring to his sexual orienta-
tion.” Id. at 107.
85 Id.
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(“EEOC”).”86 However, the court observed “legal doctrine evolves and in
2015 the EEOC held, for the first time, that ‘sexual orientation is inherently
a “sex-based consideration;”’ accordingly an allegation of discrimination
based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination
under Title VII.”87 Discussing the evolution of Title VII interpretation since
passage of the statute, the Second Circuit explained, “[B]ecause Congress
could not anticipate the full spectrum of employment discrimination that
would be directed at the protected categories, it falls to courts to give effect
to the broad language that Congress used.”88
Expansive, progressive judicial decision-making in the context of em-
ployment law is not limited to issues pertaining to sexual harassment or
LGBTQ status, or even to Title VII. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently considered changing social attitudes in Rizo v. Yovino89 when it held
en banc that employers can no longer evade the restrictions of the Equal Pay
Act90 by calculating employees’ salaries based on their prior salary.91 For
many years it was widely assumed that prior salary was a fair measure of
one’s worth, and a 1982 Ninth Circuit decision had allowed the employer to
consider prior salary along with a series of other factors including “ability,
education, [and] experience.”92 Rejecting this precedent, the Rizo court con-
86 Id. The two prior Second Circuit cases that disallowed sexual orientation claims under
Title VII were Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) and Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–23 (2d Cir. 2005).
87 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107 (quoting Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080,
2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015)).
88 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 115 (citing, also, to Supreme Court’s recognition of hostile work
environment claims, even though those do not appear in the statutory text). Along similar
lines, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,
found that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is necessarily
discrimination on the basis of sex, and thus the EEOC should have had the opportunity to
prove that the Funeral Home violated Title VII by firing Stephens because she is transgender
and transitioning from male to female.” 884 F.3d 560, 571 (2018). The Sixth Circuit further
found that “Title VII protects transgender persons because of their transgender or transitioning
status, because transgender or transitioning status constitutes an inherently gender non-con-
forming trait.” Id. at 577.
89 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
90 The Equal Pay Act provides, in relevant part, that no employer shall pay employees of
one sex lower wages than those of the opposite sex for jobs of “equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,” except pursuant to a
seniority system, a merit system, a system that measures quantity or quality of production, or
“a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
91 The Ninth Circuit held, “[P]rior salary alone or in combination with other factors can-
not justify a wage differential. To hold otherwise––to allow employers to capitalize on the
persistence of the wage gap and perpetuate that gap ad infinitum––would be contrary to the
text and history of the Equal Pay Act, and would vitiate the very purpose for which the Act
stands.” Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456–57.
92 Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 874, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1982). The first Ninth
Circuit panel to consider Rizo felt compelled, by Kouba, to allow consideration of prior salary
by employers as long as that factor “was reasonable and effectuated some business policy,”
Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018).
However, the en banc panel instead found that “Kouba, however construed, is inconsistent
with the rule that we have announced in this opinion, [and therefore] it must be overruled.”
Rizo, 887 F.3d at 468.
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sidered not only the text of the statute,93 “basic principles of statutory inter-
pretation,”94 legislative history of the Equal Pay Act,95 and decisions from
other federal courts of appeals,96 but also new interpretations of public pol-
icy. The en banc panel expressly noted that “over fifty years after the pas-
sage of the Equal Pay Act, the wage gap between men and women is not
some inert historical relic of bygone assumptions and sex-based oppres-
sion,”97 but rather a gap that continues to persist and “costs women in the
U.S. over $840 billion a year.”98 Perhaps the decision in part reflects the
power of the #MeToo movement. A 2018 survey of human resources manag-
ers found that 48% of companies surveyed stated they were reviewing their
pay policies to check for gender inequities.99
As the decisions summarized above demonstrate, our understandings of
statutes and constitutions evolve over time, influenced by new social per-
spectives and frequently (albeit not inevitably) leading to a greater protec-
tion of rights.100 Not so very long ago, many in the United States assumed
that it was acceptable to separate races in schools, housing, transportation,
and marriage; to preclude homosexuals from marrying one another; to hire
or refuse to hire people for certain jobs based on their race or gender; to state
that a woman’s place was primarily in the home; to rely freely on sexual or
93 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460–61.
94 Id. at 461.
95 Id. at 462–64.
96 Id. at 465–68.
97 Id. at 468.
98 Id. at 468 (quoting Brief of Equal Rights Advocates as Amicus Curiae et al. for Plain-
tiff-Appellee at 11, Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018)) (citing National Partnership
for Women and Families, America’s Women and the Wage Gap 2 (2017), http://www.nation-
alpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/americas-women-and-the-wage-
gap.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KYU6-WUWX).
99 Julie Carpenter, #MeToo and #TimesUp Have Pushed 48% of Companies to Review Pay
Policies, CNNMONEY (Feb. 28, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/28/pf/gender-pay-gap/
index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/N4H9-SE6E (citing Challenger, Gray & Christmas,
Inc., Pay Parity Survey: Reviewing Compensation Policies After #TimesUp, http://www.chal-
lengergray.com/press/press-releases/pay-parity-survey-half-companies-reviewing-compensa-
tion-policies-after-timesup, archived at https://perma.cc/35TD-BS2F (reporting on survey of
150 human resources executives from companies of various sizes in industries throughout the
United States)).
100 Of course, it is also true that rights are sometimes contracted in the employment arena
as in others, whether through legislation or court decision. For instance, the Court’s decisions
in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998) have widely been interpreted as letting employers largely off the hook for
sexual harassment so long as the employer makes efforts to provide training and an internal
complaint system. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 697–715 (2000). Similarly, Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) failed to recognize that sexual harassment may exist even though
the harasser is not motivated by sexual desire. A number of scholars have critiqued this per-
spective on sexual harassment. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,
107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1701–02 (1998). Moreover, in Vance v. Ball State U., 570 U.S. 421, 424
(2013), the Court held that a supervisor is defined narrowly as being someone capable of
taking “tangible employment actions against the victim”; and in Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001), the Court limited employees’ ability to recover on Title
VII retaliation claims.
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other stereotypes; or to make sexual comments or jokes, and to engage in
non-consensual touching, in the workplace setting. These dramatic evolu-
tions in judicial thinking have not happened in a vacuum, but rather in a
context of powerful social movements and cultural changes. But, with the
rise of mandatory employment arbitration, it is not clear that social move-
ments and cultural changes will continue to have the legal impact they once
did.
II. THE RISE AND STULTIFYING IMPACT OF MANDATORY
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
For social movements and judicial decisions to influence one another,
there must be opportunities for judicial intervention. Yet the rapidly growing
phenomenon of mandatory employment arbitration in the United States is
sharply limiting the number of employees who have access to court. Alexan-
der Colvin has recently estimated that over 50% of the non-unionized pri-
vate-sector U.S. workforce is covered by mandatory arbitration clauses.101 In
the United States, every employee who is covered by such a clause must
bring any claims against their employer via arbitration rather than in court.102
To acclimate readers to what is often an opaque system, this Part will discuss
what employment arbitration is, whether it is legal, and how its impact has
generally been discussed in the past. It will then analyze how the growth of
mandatory employment arbitration uniquely harms the most vulnerable
members of our society by stultifying the development of progressive em-
ployment law.
A. What is Employment Arbitration?
To appreciate the impact mandatory arbitration has on individuals and
on the development of the law, one must first understand how employment
101 Alexander J. S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration: Access to the
Courts is Now Barred for More Than 60 Million American Workers, ECON. POLICY INST. 55
(Sept. 27, 2017), epi.org/135056, archived at https://perma.cc/CET2-T2VH (reporting results
of study showing that 56% of nonunion employees in surveyed companies were subject to
mandatory arbitration provisions). Colvin cites earlier work, showing much lower numbers,
leading him to conclude that the use of mandatory arbitration clauses has grown very substan-
tially in the past thirty years. Id. at 4. For another recent empirical study of employment arbi-
tration, see Imre S. Szalai, The Widespread Use of Workplace Arbitration Among America’s
Top 100 Companies 2 (2017), THE EMP. RIGHTS ADVOCACY INST. FOR LAW & POLICY, https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3063359, archived at https://perma.cc/RN3Z-FWM2 (finding that 80% of
Fortune 100 companies, “including subsidiaries or affiliates, have used arbitration agreements
in connection with workplace-related disputes since 2010” and that half of those have used
arbitral class action waivers).
102 See infra Part II.B. It is also true that if the employer has claims against the employee,
such as for breach of contract or defamation, those too must be brought in arbitration, absent a
contractual exception.
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arbitration “agreements” come into existence.103 Some commentary on the
subject gives the impression of an idealized model in which employees and
employers sit down together and discuss how they would prefer to resolve
future legal disputes, should they arise. For example, Justice Gorsuch’s open-
ing sentence in the Supreme Court’s recent 5–4 decision in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis asks: “Should employees and employers be allowed to agree
that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitra-
tion?”104 Occasionally this idealized model may accurately reflect the way
employment arbitration clauses come into existence. High-level executives
or individuals with unique talents may indeed negotiate personal employ-
ment contracts, and such contracts may well include arbitration clauses.105 In
addition, some unions may negotiate arbitration clauses that require mem-
bers to arbitrate not only disputes arising under the contract itself, but also
statutory claims.106
Generally, however, so-called “agreements” to arbitrate are unilaterally
imposed by employers on employees who likely are not aware the terms
exist, and, in any case, have little choice but to accept the provision if they
want to get or keep their jobs.107 While the Federal Arbitration Act does
require arbitration agreements to be “written,”108 they need not be signed,
and courts have upheld “agreements” formed in a variety of ways.109
103 Commentators have debated whether form arbitration clauses deserve to be called
“agreements.” In a legal sense, courts have made clear that they, like other contracts of adhe-
sion, are enforceable. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014). On the other hand, it is also clear that
employees do not typically “agree” to these terms in any meaningful sense, as they often are
not aware of the terms much less knowledgeable about their implications. See Jeff Sovern et
al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Con-
sumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2015).
104 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). This case holds that companies can use arbitration
clauses to prevent workers from filing joint claims or class actions, notwithstanding the protec-
tions afforded by the National Labor Relations Act to collective action. Id. at 1624–25.
105 See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employ-
ment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 234
(2006). The arbitration clauses entered into by top Fox News broadcasters fall in this category.
See infra Part III.C.
106 See generally Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Incorporating Mandatory Arbitration Employ-
ment Clauses into Collective Bargaining Agreements: Challenges and Benefits to the Em-
ployer and the Union, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1025 (2014).
107 See Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind
of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed? 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 60,
63–65 (2014) (observing that while, in early years, many employment arbitration clauses were
individually negotiated by higher level executives, more recently the bulk of clauses are
broadly promulgated by employers to cover lower level employees). See generally RADIN,
BOILERPLATE, supra note 103; Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts,” supra note 103.
108 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).
109 See cases cited infra. See also Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that mandatory arbitration provision in employee handbook was enforcea-
ble because it was supported by adequate consideration); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc.,
113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitration clause was separate from other
provisions of employee handbook and constituted an enforceable contract). But see Carey v.
24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 209 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that arbitration agree-
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Mandatory arbitration “agreements” are often imposed in the fine print of
employment or related applications,110 employee handbooks, envelope stuff-
ers, computer click-throughs, or e-mails.111 The dissent in Epic Systems, in
fact, noted that the clauses at issue there were e-mailed by several companies
to employees who were told if they continued to work at the companies they
would be deemed to have accepted the terms.112 Studies have shown that
these kinds of clauses are not, in fact, generally read or understood by em-
ployees;113 certainly these are not the knowing agreements alluded to by Jus-
tice Gorsuch.114 Yet these are precisely the types of provisions imposed by
employers in a broad array of industries, including restaurants,115 big box
ment in employee handbook was illusory); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d
756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding employee did not agree to arbitrate claims by acknowledging
receipt of revised employee handbook).
110 The claims brought to the Supreme Court reflect that employer promulgated clauses
are more common than individually negotiated clauses. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (noting that SEC form U-9 requires all claims by certain
securities industry employees to be arbitrated); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 109 (2001) (signed employment application); EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 283
(2002) (signed employment application); Rent-a-Center West Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 73
(2010) (arbitration clause imposed as condition of employment).
111 Alexander Colvin finds that “[a]lthough mandatory employment arbitration is usually
established by having employees sign an arbitration agreement, typically at the time of hiring,
in some instances businesses adopt arbitration procedures simply by announcing that these
procedures have been incorporated into the organization’s employment policies.” Colvin,
supra note 101, at 5.
112 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1636 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Employees who con-
tinue to work for a company that has imposed arbitration may well be deemed to have
“agreed” to arbitration. See Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 507 F.3d 967, 972–73 (6th Cir.
2007) (holding that employment arbitration provision was enforceable where employer publi-
cized new program and mailed letters to employees notifying them that they would be covered
if they did not quit); Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 734–36 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding
employee was bound by arbitration provision imposed after her hiring, even though employee
swore she had never seen the brochure introducing the program and could only have avoided
program by quitting her job).
113 See, e.g., Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1320. See also Sovern et
al., “Whimsy Little Contracts,” supra note 103.
114 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1619. Cf. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RES. 559, 569 (2001) (recognizing that employees may well not focus on arbitration
requirement in employment agreement but asserting that such provisions should nonetheless
be as enforceable as other contractual terms).
115 See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282–83; Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239,
240–41 (4th Cir. 2001) (Olive Garden); Dantz v. Am. Apple Grp., LLC., 123 F. App’x 702,
703 (6th Cir. 2005) (Applebee’s).
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retail establishments,116 securities firms,117 law firms,118 tech companies,119
and start-ups like Uber.120
So what does employment arbitration actually look like, and how does
it work? Arbitration can be defined as “a process in which a third party who
is not acting as a judge renders a decision in a dispute.”121 Though the details
of this process will differ situation-to-situation based on how the provision is
written,122 arbitration in the employment context tends to look a certain way.
Employment arbitration is typically initiated by a pleading that looks fairly
similar to a complaint that might be filed in court.123 Subject matter may
include statutory claims for discrimination or violations of other federal or
state statutes. It can also include common law claims for breach of contract,
defamation, business torts, or personal injury. Sometimes claims are brought
by the employer against the employee, rather than by the employee against
the employer.124 Once the claim is filed, an arbitrator is selected, often pursu-
ant to rules set by a private organization such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) or JAMS (formerly Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services) hosting the arbitration.125 The process of arbitrator selection typi-
cally gives both sides an opportunity to select or de-select arbitrators based
116 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109; Circuit City Stores. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109
(9th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 374 (4th Cir. 1998).
117 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (noting that SEC form
U-9 requires all claims by certain securities industry employees to be arbitrated).
118 See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that law firms may require employees to sign Title VII arbitration agreements). See
also Brett A. Smith & Joshua L. Schwarz, Keeping Lawyers Out of Court? A Survey of the
Prevalence of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Law Firms, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
183, 190–95 (2003).
119 Microsoft recently agreed not to impose arbitration on its employees in sexual harass-
ment claims, but many other tech companies still do so, and Microsoft presumably does as
well, in non-sexual harassment claims. See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
120 See Jill I. Gross, The Uberization of Arbitration Clauses, 9 ARB. L. REV. 43, 45–46
(2017). See also Charlotte Garden, Disrupting Work Law: Arbitration in the Gig Economy,
2017 U. CHI. L. FORUM 205, 212 (2018).
121 CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL 383 (2d ed. 2011).
122 Id. at 383–84 (showing arbitration can, for example, be formal or informal, private or
public, legalistic or not); see also Jean R. Sternlight, “Arbitration Schmarbitration”: Examin-
ing the Benefits and Frustrations of Defining the Process, 18 NEV. L.J. 371, 374 (2018).
123 For example, the American Arbitration Association, which one study showed handles
about half of filed employment arbitration disputes, ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D.
GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS AND OUT-
COMES: RESEARCH REPORT TO THE ROBERT L. HABUSH ENDOWMENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSO-
CIATION FOR JUSTICE 34–35 (2014), provides the demand form available here: https://www.adr
.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/, archived at https://perma.cc/UJ7D-95AV.
124 See Colvin & Pike, supra note 107, at 66 (finding that roughly 10% of employment R
arbitration disputes examined in a particular study involved claims by employers against em-
ployees, such as for allegedly breaching the employment contract or defaming the employer).
125 AAA rules on employment arbitration are provided here: AMERICAN ARBITRATION AS-
SOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATIONS RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/EmploymentRules_Web.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/7P4X-KE5T [hereinafter AAA RULES]. JAMS Employment Ar-
bitration Rules & Procedures are set out here: JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES &
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on their credentials and whatever else the parties can learn about their prior
decisions.126
After being selected, the arbitrator sets dates, may allow a limited
amount of discovery, and may consider motions, including potentially mo-
tions to dismiss or for summary judgment.127 If the matter is not resolved on
a dispositive motion and does not settle, the arbitration hearing typically
takes place in a conference room selected by the arbitrator.128 The neutral
arbitrator is often, but not necessarily, an attorney or a retired judge.129 Either
or both parties may be represented by an attorney, but sometimes parties
appear pro se.130 Witnesses may be called and evidence may be presented,
but the rules of evidence are usually more relaxed than those that would be
used in court.131
The arbitrator ultimately writes a decision, but the decision may be
fairly short and will not necessarily contain extensive legal reasoning.132 For
PROCEDURES (July 1, 2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration, archived
at https://perma.cc/LL88-DXJD [hereinafter JAMS RULES].
126 AAA RULE 13, supra note 125, at 16; JAMS RULE 15, supra note 125, at 14–15. The
fact that arbitrators have an incentive to write decisions that might encourage parties to hire
them in the future has given rise to what critics call the “repeat arbitrator” phenomenon: as
employers are typically involved in far more disputes than employees, arbitrators have more of
an economic incentive to please employers than they do to please employees. See generally
Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of Employment Dis-
crimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 805 (2013); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP’T. POL’Y J. 189 (1997).
127 JAMS RULES 17 & 18, supra note 125, at 16–17; AAA RULES 9 & 27, supra note 125,
at 14, 19. The arbitration clause can be drafted to allow or disallow particular types of discov-
ery and particular kinds of motions. See Imre S. Szalai, The Consent Amendment: Restoring
Meaningful Consent and Respect for Human Dignity in America’s Civil Justice System, 24 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 195, 224 (2017); John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding
the 7 Deadly Sins, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 36 (2003). Along these lines, the AAA provides a
“clause builder” that encourages parties to draft the clause to fit their particular needs. Clause
Builder Tool, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www
.clausebuilder.org, , archived at https://perma.cc/X9BR-HAPC.
128 AAA RULE 11, supra note 125, at 14; JAMS RULE 19, supra note 125, at 18.
129 AAA Rules require employment arbitrators to be “experienced in the area of employ-
ment law.” AAA RULE 12(b), supra note 125, at 13 (quoting Rule 12(b)). The JAMS clause
drafting website notes that parties can determine what qualifications they prefer for their arbi-
trators. JAMS CLAUSE WORKBOOK 4 (June 1, 2018), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS-ADR-Clauses.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/V2VF-FY5P.
130 One recent study showed that roughly one third of employment arbitrations were filed
by employees pro se. Colvin & Pike, supra note 107, at 69. When this author conducted her R
own small study of the 22 cases posted by AAA on Lexis for 2018 as of June 24, 2018, she
found just four involved pro se employees.
131 The JAMS Rules state: “Strict conformity to the rules of evidence is not required,
except that the Arbitrator shall apply applicable law relating to privileges and work product.”
JAMS RULE 22(d), supra note 125, at 19. The AAA Rules state: “The arbitrator shall be the
judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered, and conformity to legal rules of
evidence shall not be necessary.” AAA RULE 30, supra note 125, at 21.
132 Arbitration decisions in employment cases do, however, tend to be longer than those
issued in other business contexts. See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration
and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 449, 512 (2005) (“[A]rbitrators—particularly in
commercial cases—are not expected to write reasoned opinions attempting to explain and
justify their decisions, and the AAA in fact has traditionally discouraged them from doing
so.”); Dean B. Thompson, Arbitration Theory & Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction
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example, the AAA Rules require arbitrators to “provide the written reasons
for their award unless the parties agree otherwise,”133 but often the primary
focus of the decision is factual, rather than legal. The AAA Rules also re-
quire that “[a]n award issued under these rules shall be publicly available,
on a cost basis.”134 Currently, AAA employment awards are available, for a
fee, from LEXIS, Westlaw, BNA & Kluwer.135 However, the fact that these
decisions are available may not be well known, and other arbitration provid-
ers may not make their decisions publicly available. As binding arbitration
decisions are extremely difficult to vacate, appellate courts are rarely asked
to review the binding awards.136
B. Is Mandatory Employment Arbitration Legal?
In the United States,137 current law clearly permits companies to require
their employees to arbitrate future disputes. Although many commentators
have argued that mandatory employment arbitration is or should be pro-
scribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)138 or, in certain circum-
Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 158 (1994) (summarizing survey of construction arbi-
trators, 69% of whom reported that they do not usually explain the reasons for their awards).
133 American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
DISPUTES (Including Mediation and Arbitration Rules), R. 34(c) (Jan. 1, 2004), available at
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/National%20Rules%20for%20the%20Resolution%20of
%20Employment%20Disputes%20Jan%2001%2C%202004.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
RKE7-GUM7. JAMS Rules similarly provide that an award shall “contain a concise written
statement of the reasons for the Award, stating the essential findings and conclusions on which
the Award is based.” JAMS RULE 24(h), supra note 125, at 22–23.
134 AAA RULE 39(b), supra note 125, at 23.
135 E-mail from AAA Vice President Rebecca Storrow to author (June 12, 2018) (on file
with author). A search of the LEXIS database revealed 275 published AAA decisions from
2017, and 22 for 2018, as of June 24, 2018. Prior years’ decisions are also available.
136 In the United States, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1–15 (2012),
arbitration awards must generally be enforced unless it can be shown that the award was
procured by corruption or fraud or that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or similar. 9
U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). Courts have repeatedly held that “mere” errors of law or fact do not
justify vacating an arbitral award. See, e.g., Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp.,
86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th
Cir. 1995)) (“[F]actual or legal errors by arbitrators––even clear or gross errors––do not au-
thorize courts to annul awards.”); see also MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 121, at R
462–65 (discussing standard for vacating arbitral awards). While some courts have allowed
arbitral awards to be vacated for “manifest disregard of the law,” this is a very high standard
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 585
(2008), raises questions whether this challenge even continues to be viable at all under federal
law.
137 Policies in other countries are quite different. In the European Union, for example,
employers may not force their employees into arbitration. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The
Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of Ameri-
can Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 418 (2011) (discussing the fact that many EU
jurisdictions refuse to enforce arbitration agreements in employment contracts); see also Jean
R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on A Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Con-
sumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831,
848–50 (2002).
138 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1925). Passed in 1925, the FAA was intended to ensure that courts
would enforce arbitration clauses entered into knowingly by two business entities. Thus, many
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stances, by the Constitution,139 these arguments have usually failed.
Shocking many, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,140 a 7–2 Su-
preme Court ruled in 1991 that a claim brought under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act by a manager in the securities industry could be
subjected to compulsory arbitration.141 The Gilmer Court justified its conclu-
sion in part by reasoning that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”142
However, subsequent decisions soon revealed that the Court prioritizes
preserving arbitration over protecting employees’ rights.143 Technically, the
Gilmer decision was not an employment case, because Mr. Gilmer was re-
quired to arbitrate by stock exchange rules, rather than by his brokerage
employer.144 But, the Supreme Court soon made clear that employers could
also require their employees to arbitrate claims against their employers, even
though Section 1 of the FAA would seem to preclude the practice for all
employees involved in interstate commerce.145 That Section states: “[B]ut
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
commentators have argued that the FAA was never meant to support and should not support
the use of mandatory arbitration, imposed by a company on employees or consumers. See, e.g.,
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 26, at 697; see also IMRE SZALAI, OUT-
SOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 192–93 (2013);
Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbi-
tration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. L. REV. 99, 157 (2006).
139 This author has suggested possible constitutional arguments using Article III, the Due
Process Clause, and the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 669–733 (2001); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Su-
preme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separa-
tion of Powers and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997). But courts and some
commentators have not been persuaded by these arguments. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
140 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
141 The Supreme Court relied on the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., to
hold that “statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursu-
ant to the FAA.” Id. at 26. The decision was surprising to many because it essentially reversed
the Court’s prior holding in Alexander v. Gardner Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974), which
found that employers could not use a collective bargaining agreement to require employees to
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims under Title VII. See generally Richard A. Bales, Nor-
mative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceanera, 81 TULANE L. REV.
331, 336–40 (2006).
142 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
143 See generally Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed
Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 116 (2015) (as-
serting that Court has abandoned its purported concern with protecting consumers’ and em-
ployees’ ability to vindicate their substantive rights in arbitration).
144 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39–40.
145 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122–23 (2001). In other contexts, the
Court has defined “interstate commerce” extremely broadly, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
29 (2005), so such a prohibition would seemingly apply to most workers in our modern
economy.
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terstate commerce.”146 Nonetheless, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the
Court held that employers could generally require individual employees to
arbitrate, and that the Section 1 exclusion language should be interpreted
extremely narrowly.147 Then, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, the Court concluded
that a collective bargaining agreement could require unionized employees to
arbitrate statutory employment claims so long as the “arbitration provision
expressly covers both statutory and contractual discrimination claims.”148
When the Court’s subsequent decision in American Express v. Italian Colors
Restaurant found that arbitration clauses can impose class action waivers,
even when such waivers effectively deny plaintiffs the practical opportunity
to bring a claim,149 it became even clearer that employers could use arbitra-
tion clauses to insulate themselves from liability under federal and state em-
ployment laws.150
The Court’s most recent employment arbitration decision, Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis,151 is one of its most significant and most damaging to em-
ployees. Building on American Express v. Italian Colors, the Court ruled
(5–4) that it was permissible for companies to use mandatory arbitration
clauses to prevent employees from joining together in group or class litiga-
tion, notwithstanding that the National Labor Relations Act provides all em-
ployees with a right to engage in “concerted activities.”152 It is widely
predicted that this decision will lead increasing numbers of employers to use
forced arbitration to prevent employees from bringing class action suits or
146 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2016). A case now pending in the Supreme Court, New Prime Inc. v.
Oliveira, 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018) (No.
17–340), raises the question of whether this exclusion even applies to interstate truckers.
147 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115–19 (interpreting Section 1’s exclusion narrowly to apply
only to transportation workers––those directly engaged in interstate commerce). Most aca-
demic commentators criticized the Court’s approach. See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 138, at
191–92; Matthew W. Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA—Reconsidered, 48 LAB.
L.J. 328, 329 (1997); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration
After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 458 (2016); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering
the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the
Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RES. 259, 279 (1991). But see Samuel
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1345, 1365–72 (1997) (arguing that Section 1 applies only to transportation workers).
148 556 U.S. 247, 264 (2009).
149 570 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2013).
150 Although American Express involved a claim by restaurants under antitrust law, rather
than employment law, there is no reason to believe the Court would have held any differently
in an employment case. See, e.g., Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1318–19
n.60 (pointing to management consulting companies’ enthusiastic embrace of the American
Express decision).
151 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
152 The majority rejected employees’ argument, previously accepted by the National Labor
Relations Board, that class and collective actions are “concerted activities.” Epic Systems, 138
S. Ct. at 1624–30. The majority also found that even if employees had a protected right it was
overridden by the Federal Arbitration Act, which it interpreted as requiring enforcement of all
agreements to arbitrate absent generally applicable contract defenses. Id.
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group litigation of any type.153 The significance of this is discussed in Part C
below.154
Employees have limited additional tools at their disposal to challenge
the legality of mandatory arbitration requirements. Standard contract argu-
ments like unconscionability, fraud, or lack of agreement are rarely success-
ful.155 Moreover, the Court’s decisions allow employers (and others) to
require that arbitrators, rather than courts, consider the question of whether
the arbitration clause is enforceable.156 One need not be too cynical to be-
lieve that arbitrators, whose future income depends upon the arbitration go-
ing forward, are unlikely to find that an arbitration clause is
unenforceable.157 In short, when United States employers require their em-
ployees to resolve claims in arbitration rather than in litigation, employees
have little hope of convincing courts to instead allow them to litigate their
disputes.
C. Impact of Employment Arbitration Generally
As many commentators have extensively discussed the overall impact
of the Supreme Court’s employment arbitration jurisprudence, the subject
will be treated briefly. This Section will first address the critiques but then
also consider some defenses of the practice.
Those skeptical of employers’ use of mandatory arbitration worry that
this process will substantially harm both individual employees and deterred
the public.158 On the individual side, critics urge that forced arbitration has
and will deter meritorious employee claims.159 Indeed, although more than
153 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules that Companies Can Require Workers to Accept
Individual Arbitration, WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli
tics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-that-companies-can-force-workers-into-individual-arbitra
tion/2018/05/21/09a3a968-5cfa-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.21432ccf1450, archived at https://perma.cc/T4QQ-L2HW; Garrett Epps, An Epic Su-
preme Court Decision on Employment, THE ATLANTIC (May 22, 2018), https://www.theatlan
tic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-court-decision-on-employment/560963/,
archived at https://perma.cc/ZH9X-U9U5 (noting “the court’s decision in Epic Systems will
inevitably lead to an explosion of these imposed contracts”).
154 See infra Part II.C.
155 See F. Paul Bland, Jr., Is That Arbitration Clause Unconscionable? PROVE IT!, CON-
SUMER ADVOC. (Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Washington, D.C.), July-Aug. 2002. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has held that when courts are too willing to strike down arbitration
clauses as unconscionable, such decisions are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
156 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (holding that arbitration
clause could delegate, to arbitrators, the responsibility for determining whether the arbitration
clause was unconscionable, so long as that delegation was not, itself, unconscionable).
157 See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 375 (2018)
(“Many plaintiffs would be surprised to find that they have entrusted an arbitrator—who,
unlike a judge, bills by the hour—to decide the very question whether a dispute should be
arbitrated.”).
158 See Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 26, at 1661–65.
159 See, e.g., Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1328–29; Cynthia
Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 691–93 (2018).
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half of the American workforce is now covered by arbitration clauses,160 just
a few thousand American workers file arbitration claims each year.161 This
suppression effect is easily explained. First, employment arbitration clauses
often include express language proscribing employees from participating in
class or group claims in either litigation or arbitration—a practice that, as
noted above, the Supreme Court has endorsed.162 In fact, Alexander Colvin
recently found that roughly 40% of employees covered by arbitration clauses
were subject to class action waivers.163 This is significant because many em-
ployment claims cannot feasibly be brought individually. Such claims might
be too costly, particularly in relation to expected monetary relief; employees
might not even realize they had been harmed or that the harm was unlawful;
or individual employees might hesitate to file due to fear of retaliation by
their employer or others in the industry.164 By wiping out class actions and
group claims, employers can effectively insulate themselves from much em-
ployee liability.165
In addition to eviscerating class actions, mandatory arbitration also sup-
presses claims by making it even harder for employees to retain attorneys
than it otherwise would be.166 Attorneys will be more reluctant to take on an
employee’s claim if the designated forum reduces the likelihood of success,
awards lower monetary damages, and proscribes group claims and class ac-
tions.167 Those few individuals who do proceed to arbitration generally fare
worse than they would have in litigation. The best and most recent empirical
studies show that employees both win less often and win less money when
disputing claims in arbitration rather than in litigation.168 While pro se repre-
160 Colvin, Growing Use, supra note 101, at 1–2 (reporting that 56.2% of private-sector R
nonunion employees are subject to mandatory employment procedures).
161 Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1330 (estimating that only a few
thousand employees file arbitration claims each year, even though millions of employees are
covered by mandatory arbitration provisions). Though some might suggest that this is because
only a minute number of employees have viable claims, the fact that thousands upon thousands
of employees file claims in court (when they can) or file claims with the EEOC or state agen-
cies shows that arbitration is truly suppressing claims. Id. at 1330–31.
162 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632. While the focus is often placed on class actions,
employers may also use arbitration clauses to eviscerate other kinds of group claims.
163 Colvin, Growing Use, supra note 101, at 2. R
164 Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1347.
165 Although some continue to believe that arbitration can be a viable forum for those who
have small claims and who cannot obtain legal representation, a recent study shows that very
few such employment arbitration claims are filed. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note
147, at 471; see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (“Employment arbi-
tration appears to be a dispute resolution system predominantly based on employee representa-
tion by counsel, as is the case with litigation.”).
166 Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1334–36. Even absent arbitration,
most employees find it hard to retain attorneys, as they often will lack savings to pay an
attorney by the hour, and their damages and likelihood of success may not be sufficient to
attract a contingent fee attorney. Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1326; see also Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 147, at 478–79 (providing
detailed statistics on arbitration results).
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sentation is a viable alternative in theory, in practice employees do not often
attempt to represent themselves in arbitration.169 This reluctance is under-
standable; a recent study found the pro se arbitration win rate to be just
7%.170 One author has cleverly called this suppression effect the “black
hole” phenomenon, because claims that might have existed simply disap-
pear.171 Some critics worry much more about this suppression effect than the
fact, which is also true, that those employees who end up in arbitration tend
not to do very well.172
On the other hand, mandatory employment arbitration does have its de-
fenders. Some have argued that arbitration provides a quicker, cheaper form
of dispute resolution. Professor Samuel Estreicher colorfully contended that
it is better to provide Saturns (a no-frills car of its day) for everyone, than
Cadillacs for the few and rickshaws for most.173 Studies do confirm that arbi-
tration tends to be quicker than litigation.174 Supporters of mandatory arbitra-
tion also claim that the results of employment arbitration are sometimes
favorable to employees,175 though the studies cited tend to focus on claims
brought by higher level employees with voluntarily negotiated agreements
rather than on claims brought by employees covered by mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements.176 Some defenders of the practice also urge that the impact
of employment arbitration should be considered in the broader context of
other employer human resources practices, including complaint processes
and mediation, that may serve as an internal mechanism for resolving
disputes.177
169 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Para-
digm, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 391–400 (2010) (disputing the common view that alterna-
tive dispute resolution (“ADR”) is necessarily an effective route for unrepresented parties).
170 Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 147, at 485. And, of course, a “win” may result
in only a very small dollar recovery.
171 See Estlund, Black Hole, supra note 158, at 682. See generally Bales, Quinceanera,
supra note 141, at 334 (“One criticism, however, has proven valid: some employers have used R
their superior bargaining power to impose on employees lopsided agreements that make it all
but impossible for employees to pursue valid claims and that deter most employees from even
trying to do so.”); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND.
L.J. 239 (2012) (critiquing Supreme Court arbitration decisions for suppressing claims).
172 See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1312.
173 Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws, supra note 114, at 563. However, studies show that R
employees do not bring many small claims in arbitration. Sternlight, Disarming Employees,
supra note 26, at 1336; see also Colvin & Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws, supra note 107, at 61 R
(updating Estreicher’s thesis with the benefit of current empirical research).
174 See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury, 11 EM. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 426–27 (2007).
175 See, e.g., Bales, Quinceanera, supra note 141, at 347–49.
176 See generally Colvin, Clarity, supra note 173, at 412–24.
177 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843, 862–63 (2008).
See also Bales, Quinceanera, supra note 141, at 343 (noting that many employers impose
arbitration as part of a much broader dispute resolution process). At minimum, some commen-
tators urge that it is difficult to assess the impact of forced arbitration, and that we should not
condemn the practice without sufficient data. See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, &
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Turning to the impact of mandatory arbitration on society more gener-
ally, critics have long worried that requiring employees to arbitrate rather
than litigate claims will undermine the force of law not only by suppressing
claims, but also by requiring claims to be heard privately and limiting easy
access to precedent.178 The fear is that these effects will both undermine pub-
lic policies and also lessen the deterrence effect of laws that exist but are not
effectively enforced.179 As Geraldine Moohr opines, “arbitration is not an
effective forum in which to satisfy the public policy goals of the employ-
ment discrimination statutes.”180 This concern applies to other non-discrimi-
nation workplace laws and policies as well.181 For example, Charlotte Garden
has explained that forcing contingent workers, such as Uber and Lyft drivers,
into arbitration will reduce the deterrent effect of our laws on prohibited
unfair labor practices.182 Parallel arguments have been made in other coun-
tries too.183
Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (2005).
178 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1497 (2004)
(pointing out that employment arbitration, which is typically kept private, and often results in
determinations lacking in reasoned analysis, “will not have educative or precedential value”);
Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Un-
willing to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 704 (2004) (noting that “the lack of
[judicial] opinions stunts[s] the growth of the law”). But cf. Sternlight, Creeping, supra note
26, at 1661–75 (setting out traditional public justice critique of arbitration, which is based on
the idea that private arbitration may not provide the public good of educating society about law
and justice, but also recognizing that a system of justice may also serve other purposes beyond
enforcement of the law, including protecting interests in procedural justice and promoting
reconciliation).
179 See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2838–39 (2015). See gener-
ally RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 103, at 3–18. R
180 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 396 (1999). Professor Moohr argues that because employment
arbitration is non-governmental, confidential, and final it is less effective than litigation in
serving public policy purposes such as deterrence and development of precedent. Id. at
426–40.
181 For example, employees’ claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. (2012), are increasingly being forced into arbitration. See Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to
Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates that Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage
Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1125–26 (2012). Arbitration arguably undermines
public policy in other areas of law as well. See Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation:
How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193,
1241 (2016) (discussing “informational value” of public litigation). For a related argument in
the securities context, see Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 427,
430 (2018). Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
52 (2008) (explaining, in the business context, that arbitration frequently “blocks public access
to information revealed in the arbitration”).
182 Garden, Disrupting Work Law, supra note 120, at 206, 209; see also Ruan, supra note
180, at 1119–21.
183 See, e.g., ROSEMARY HUNTER, INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE xxiii
(1992) (stating that provisions for indirect discrimination are rarely publicized and even more
rarely analyzed as an element of a claim). See generally Sternlight, In Search, supra note 177
(comparing U.S., British, and Australian efforts to enforce employment discrimination laws).
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Still, some scholars have challenged the idea that arbitration is inher-
ently “lawless.” As Christopher Drahozal notes, few have taken the time to
try to explain what this supposed lawlessness really means, or to empirically
verify the assertion that arbitration is lawless.184 Is arbitration lawless be-
cause arbitration decisions do not contain legal reasoning, or because those
decisions are not appealed or published? It is important to remember that
arbitration varies substantially from context to context. While it has been
said that “many arbitration awards contain no statement of reasons,”185 in
the employment field, by contrast to consumer or commercial settings, arbi-
trators may well write longer decisions that do contain some reasoning.186
Upon reviewing the twenty-two AAA decisions made available on LEXIS as
of June 2018,187 this author generally found them to be well-written and sev-
eral pages long. These decisions tended to focus more on facts than law,
which is not surprising given that arbitration awards are equivalent to trial
court decisions. Further, even if many employees are required to arbitrate
their claims, presumably at least some precedent will continue to exist, be-
cause not all employers mandate arbitration of all claims by all employees.188
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve these debates, though ad-
mittedly this author is convinced that mandatory employment arbitration is
harmful to both individual employees and the public at large. Rather, this
Article endeavors to draw attention to a less considered issue: whether forc-
ing employment claims into arbitration is particularly harmful to the most
vulnerable and disempowered members of our society. The terms “vulnera-
ble and disempowered” refer to those groups who are less powerful in the
social and political process, whether due to their race, ethnicity, gender, gen-
der preference, lack of economic means, immigrant status, tenuous employ-
ment situation, or other factors. One could also call these persons “discrete
and insular minorities,” the term used by the Supreme Court in its famous
184 Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 189–90
(2006).
185 Id. at 192.
186 Labor arbitration awards are among those that have more detail, though the detail tends
to focus on company practices and facts rather than on legal nuances of statutory interpreta-
tion. See Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 683, 694 (1992) (summarizing review of labor arbitration awards conducted in the
1980s, and concluding that their treatment of statutory issues was often conclusory); see also
Harry Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in AR-
BITRATION—1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59, 82 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds.,
Bureau of Nat’l Affairs 1976) (concluding from survey of arbitrators that it is questionable
whether arbitrators are competent to decide statutory employment issues).
187 The AAA states that it makes redacted versions of all of its employment arbitration
decisions available in Westlaw, LEXIS, BNA, and Kluwers databases. E-mail, supra note 135.
188 On the other hand, it may be that employers that mandate arbitration give rise to differ-
ent claims than those employers that do not mandate arbitration, in which case development of
precedent will be skewed. Bales, Quinceanera, supra note 141, at 366. See also Scott Baker, A
Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 887 (2004) (stating that
if some employers mandate arbitration and others who are more law abiding do not mandate
arbitration, the law that is made might evolve in favor of employers).
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Carolene Products decision to describe persons who lacked voting power
and who therefore needed particular protection from the courts.189 This Arti-
cle contends that these groups are harmed more than others by the imposi-
tion of mandatory employment arbitration for two reasons discussed below.
D. Particular Impact of Employment Arbitration on
the Most Vulnerable Employees
1. Arbitration Clauses Are Especially Likely to Suppress Claims of
Vulnerable Employees
As has just been discussed, forced arbitration presents an opportunity
for alternative dispute resolution in theory, but actually deters the filing of
claims in practice.190 Compared to litigation, mandatory arbitration makes it
harder for employees to secure legal representation,191 harder for employees
to participate in class actions,192 and it remains hard for employees to bring
or prevail on claims brought pro se.193 While these burdens affect all em-
ployees, they fall most heavily on the most vulnerable members of society.
The most difficult claims to bring are those that are not clearly supported by
existing law,194 that present evidentiary challenges,195 that offer minimal or
difficult to calculate monetary relief,196 or that exert high personal and emo-
tional tolls, particularly if brought individually rather than as part of a
group.197 There are several reasons why these factors are likely to affect the
disempowered and most vulnerable more intensely than other employees.
When vulnerable employees’ claims are weaker, due to these factors, they
will more likely be suppressed, because lawyers will not be eager to take the
claims and because individual employees will hesitate to file them on their
own. If the claims also cannot be brought in class actions, that augments the
189 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 158–172 and accompanying text discussing suppression of claims. R
191 As an intellectual matter, the ability to obtain an attorney is different than the ability to
bring a claim. In theory, an employee might successfully bring a claim pro se, either in arbitra-
tion or in litigation. However, in the employment discrimination context the reality is that very
few, if any, employees will be able to prevail or gain significant relief if they are pro se. Most
employment claims are just too hard to be won pro se, in that they require both substantial
legal expertise and the ability to gather and organize significant facts. See generally Sternlight,
Disarming Employees, supra note 26; Sternlight, Lawyerless, supra note 168.
192 See Colvin, 60 Million American Workers, supra note 101, at 6.
193 See Horton & Chandrasekher, After the Revolution, supra note 147, at 25.
194 See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1335.
195 See id. at 1333.
196 See id. at 1336.
197 See, e.g., Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of
Wage Litigation and its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 366
(2013) (stating that aggrieved workers “are left with a bleak choice: stay quiet and forego
needed wages, try to find a private attorney willing to litigate a modest individual claim or
complex class claim, or wait for one’s wage claim at a government agency that might never be
answered.”).
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problem. So, when the claims of the most vulnerable employees are shunted
to arbitration they become even more difficult to bring than would otherwise
be the case. Below, these factors are explained.
First, the claims of disempowered members of society will often tend to
be weakest as a matter of law, because the lack of clear legal protection is
one reason why these employees are disempowered in the first instance. Im-
agine that an employee goes to an attorney because she believes she has
been discriminated against on the basis of a status that is not explicitly ad-
dressed under federal or state law. Knowing that the law does not provide
express protection, and that judges (or arbitrators) may not be willing to
interpret the law expansively to cover such a claim, the attorney may not be
willing to take the case, particularly on a contingent fee basis.198
Second, disempowered employees may find it particularly difficult to
amass the evidentiary proof necessary to prevail in their case.199 While many
employees face evidentiary challenges, because they lack access to employ-
ers’ documents and because fellow employees may be afraid to assist them in
a claim against the employer, such challenges may well be even greater for
members of disfavored groups. Where a straight white man might be able to
convince other straight white men to take a bit of a risk and help him with
his claim, the vulnerable employee may well face an even greater challenge
convincing other people in the workplace to testify in her favor.200 If those
other employees are not members of an oppressed group, they are less likely
to bond with the complainant and take a risk to assist them. And, if those
other employees are also members of an oppressed group, they may also be
reluctant to help because they themselves are also at risk of mistreatment. In
short, when disempowered employees seek to present claims they are partic-
ularly likely to find themselves in a situation in which even though they
should prevail as a matter of law if all of the facts could be known, the
reality is that all the evidence is not likely to come out. This may result in
claims appearing to be frivolous, even when they are not so.
198 Of course, this is a challenge that may diminish over time, depending on the jurisdic-
tion. For example, gay, lesbian, and transgender persons can now proceed more confidently in
some jurisdictions on discrimination claims as states and some federal courts are increasingly
revising statutes, providing new guidance, or issuing decisions that provide expanded protec-
tions. See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION 280–99 (9th ed. 2017); see also E.E.O.C. v. Boh Brothers Construction
Co., LLC, 731 F.3d 444, 455–56 n.7 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that “the EEOC may rely on
evidence that [a supervisor] viewed [an employee] as insufficiently masculine to prove its
Title VII claim”). See generally L. Camille He´bert, Transforming Transsexual and Trans-
gender Rights, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 535 (2009).
199 A claim may be valid, in some theoretical sense, but if an employee cannot provide
witnesses or documents in support of their allegations, they will not be able to prevail.
200 See, e.g., Lea VanderVelde, Where Is the Concept of Good Faith in the Restatement of
Employment?, 21 EM. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 335, 360 (2017) (providing two examples of in-
group bonding exercises in employment context); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Bal-
kanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 38 (2015) (discussing the use of in-group bonding to maintain white
supremacy).
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Third, the most vulnerable employees will tend to have a particularly
hard time showing substantial damages because their socioeconomic status
in society is often already low due to discrimination.201 Low provable dam-
ages, in turn, diminish access to justice, because attorneys are less likely to
take low damages cases on a contingent fee basis.202 If a person earning low
wages is terminated from their job, denied a promotion, or not hired, their
wage loss damages are lower than that of a high wage earner who is harmed
in the same way. For example, if an employee earning only $20,000 a year is
fired, their backpay claim is far lower than the otherwise similar claim of
someone who was fired from a job paying $300,000 a year. This does not
mean that the lower paid employee suffered less injury, but only that our
system of justice is inherently biased against low-income persons.
Finally, the most vulnerable members of society often most need the
opportunity to bring claims as part of a group, rather than individually.203
Disempowered people such as the poor, minority group members, or persons
lacking legal immigration status are less likely to be aware of their legal
rights and financially can least afford to bring a claim individually.204 As
well, such people may more likely fear embarrassment, retaliation, deporta-
tion, or the substantial emotional burdens that inevitably come with bringing
a claim against one’s employer.205 Thus, when arbitration clauses are used to
201 Women and minority group members, for example, are paid substantially less than
white males even when they hold comparable jobs. Alexandra N. Phillips, Promulgating Par-
ity: An Argument for A States-Based Approach to Valuing Women’s Work and Ensuring Pay
Equity in the United States, 92 TUL. L. REV. 719, 722–27 (2018).
202 See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1334–38 (discussing cost-ben-
efit analysis used by plaintiff-side employment attorneys to decide whether to take a case on a
contingent fee basis); see also Rob Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEG. PROF.
89 (2005) (explaining that while the vast majority of legal disputes involve low-income liti-
gants, the vast majority of public and private dispute resolution resources are allocated to
disputes between organizations or high-income persons, because those are the ones who can
afford access to justice).
203 Group claims include class actions but also other kinds of multi-party claims, such as
joinder of claims under FED. R. CIV. P. 20, collective claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, or multi-district litigation. All these can be proscribed by arbitration provisions. See Ster-
nlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1343–52.
204 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequal-
ity, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 339, 346–49 (2008) (reviewing empirical evidence that demonstrates
how social class and socioeconomic inequalities impact an individual’s access to justice); Sara
Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263 (2016)
(presenting results of empirical study showing that poor persons and minority group members
are hesitant to even investigate filing civil claims, due to lack of trust in the legal system and
desire to see themselves as self-sufficient).
205 The issue of reluctance to report or file claims has been discussed extensively with
respect to workplace harassment. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (2016), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/task_force_report.cfm, archived at https://
perma.cc/PT2G-6ZXH (finding that approximately 90% of workers who say they have exper-
ienced harassment never file charges or complaints).
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eliminate the right to group or collective action, again it is the most vulnera-
ble who suffer the most.206
In short, while we have already seen that the imposition of arbitration
suppresses claims, this burden will fall particularly heavily on dis-
empowered employees.207 When an attorney sees not only a claim that is a
long shot from a legal or evidentiary standard, but also a claim that must be
brought in arbitration, where win rates and recoveries are lower, they are
less likely to handle the case. The effect is amplified because poor people
and minority group members generally have the most difficulty retaining
legal representation.208 And, when arbitration is used to eliminate group and
class claims, the impact is greatest for those disempowered employees who
are least able to bring claims individually. The resulting suppression will
harm not only the individual, vulnerable employees who have suffered in-
jury in the workplace, but also other persons in such groups and the public at
large by preventing further development of the law that might have other-
wise occurred in court.
2. Employment Arbitrators Are Less Likely than Courts to Issue
Influential Progressive Decisions
Let us assume that the vulnerable employee does manage to bring a
claim in arbitration. Will the employee be able to win that claim? And, if
they do win, will they win in a way that begins to change the law for others
as well as themselves? As was previously discussed, courts often interpret
statutes and constitutional provisions more expansively over time, particu-
larly when social movements are pushing them in a more progressive direc-
tion.209 Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that this progressive trend will be
mirrored in the realm of arbitration. This is not because the people who are
arbitrators are inherently different than the people who are judges.210 Nor is
206 See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1343–52 (discussing critical
importance of class actions and group claims in employment context). See also Garden, Dis-
rupting Work Law, supra note 120, at 205 (“[T]he ubiquity with which gig economy compa-
nies require or encourage their workforces to resolve their disputes in individual arbitration
proceedings . . . make it unlikely that large swaths of gig economy workers will, as a practical
matter, be able to resolve their employment status in any forum.”).
207 See generally Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26.
208 Amy Myrick et al., Race and Representation: Racial Disparities in Legal Representa-
tion for Employment Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 710,
714–18 (2012) (reporting on empirical studies showing that pro se employees in employment
discrimination litigation typically fare substantially worse than represented employees, and
that African Americans, Hispanics and Asian Americans were significantly more likely to be
pro se than were White employees).
209 See supra Part I. Of course, there is certainly no guarantee that courts will protect the
less powerful members of society. We can only say with confidence that judicial lawmaking
will follow the overall trend of current culture. Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, supra note 21,
at 14.
210 Indeed, many arbitrators are retired judges. See James Middlemiss, Life After the
Bench: Retired Judges Embrace ADR, FIN. POST (Mar. 19, 2014), https://business.financialpost
.com/legal-post/life-after-the-bench-retired-judges-embrace-adr, archived at https://perma.cc/
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this a reflection of any express contractual or regulatory limit being placed
on arbitrators that would prevent them from interpreting law more expan-
sively or writing progressive decisions. Nonetheless, for reasons discussed
below, it seems quite unlikely that arbitrators would issue bold progressive
decisions often enough, or with a high enough degree of impact, for arbitra-
tion to be a viable source of protection for vulnerable employees.
An employment arbitration decision rendered by an AAA arbitrator in
2018 illustrates  arbitrators’ reluctance to make new law.211 In this case, the
claimant, who had worked as an on-camera meteorologist for a television
station for twenty-nine years before her contract was not renewed, alleged
that she was the victim of discrimination on the basis of sex and/or age.212
The arbitrator asked the parties to brief the question of whether these two
types of discrimination might be combined to form a claim for intersectional
discrimination—suggesting that plaintiff could try to show “discrimination
against women over the age of 40.”213 The arbitrator reported that claimant
cited cases in which courts had recognized such an “intersectional” discrim-
ination claim based on race and sex,214 and that courts have also recognized a
“sex plus” or “gender plus” category, where a person was discriminated on
the basis of a combination of gender and a neutral unprotected category.215
However, the arbitrator noted that the plaintiff “has not cited any case au-
thority recognizing an intersectional claim based on sex and age.”216 Further,
the arbitrator stated that while “[t]he general definition of intersectional dis-
crimination would logically apply to a claim based on the combination of
any two or more characteristics protected by any statute, such as sex and
age,”217 “[t]he arbitrator is not authorized to, and will not, create a com-
bined age and sex claim, when she has not been shown that a federal court
SHR3-QQUF; see also Will Carless, Judge Who Ruled Against Arbitration Activist Now an
Arbitrator, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/
news/judge-who-ruled-against-arbitration-activist-now-an-arbitrator/, archived at https://perma
.cc/M79P-3YGN; Reynolds Holding, Judges’ Action Cast Shadow on Court’s Integrity / Lure
of High-Paying Jobs as Arbitrators May Compromise Impartiality, SF GATE, Oct. 9, 2001,
https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Judges-action-cast-shadow-on-court-s-integrity-
2870890.php, archived at https://perma.cc/E7V5-KF8C.
211 2018 AAA Employment LEXIS 18 (Feb. 23, 2018).
212 Id. at 1.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 2 (citing Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032–35
(5th Cir. 1980); Harrington v. Cleburne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2001);
Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
215 Id. at 2 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir.
1975)). The issue of “intersectional” discrimination claims has received substantial attention
in academia after initial discussion by Professor Kimberle Crenshaw. See Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139
(1989). For an example of a more current discussion, see Alexander M. Nourafshan, The New
Employment Discrimination: Intra-LGBT Intersectional Invisibility and the Marginalization of
Minority Subclasses in Antidiscrimination Law, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107 (2017).
216 2018 AAA Employment LEXIS 18, at 2 (Feb. 23, 2018).
217 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-1\HLC105.txt unknown Seq: 34 13-MAR-19 10:57
188 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
has done so.”218 Apparently having agonized at least a bit over this issue, the
arbitrator went on to state the following in a footnote:
The arbitrator’s real world observations indicate that a person who
is in more than one protected class, for example, a woman over the
age of 40, or an African-American woman over the age of 40,
sometimes faces barriers in employment that, for example, men
over the age of 40, or women under the age of 40, or white men
over the age of 40, do not experience. But the arbitrator’s personal
opinion is not an appropriate substitute for legal authority, and she
is not authorized to merge elements of two different statutory
schemes—Title VII and the ADEA—when neither the courts nor
Congress have done so.219
Along similar lines, the arbitrator also raised the question of whether a me-
dia company would run afoul of the law by trying to cater to a younger
demographic by hiring younger meteorologists.220 But again, unlike many
judges might behave, the arbitrator stated she was reluctant to rule on this
issue without seeing prior case law or other authorities that supported the
same exact point raised by the complainant.221 While this single opinion can-
not be generalized to cover all arbitrators and all judges, it is a real life
exemplar of the hypothesized phenomenon—an arbitrator proving unwilling
to issue a decision expanding legal precedents.
To understand why employment arbitrators are less likely than judges to
issue progressive decisions, consider that arbitrators face an incentive struc-
ture that tends to discourage the issuance of opinions that expand upon ex-
isting legal protections. Employment arbitrators are trying to make a living,
which they do by being hired and rehired by disputants. They therefore may
not want to write creative progressive decisions that present a greater risk of
getting vacated.222 Such an outcome could annoy current disputants223 and
discourage others from hiring that arbitrator in the future. More specifically,
such an outcome could displease the employer disputant, to the detriment of
the arbitrator. Employers, particularly large corporate employers, are repeat
players who frequently hire arbitrators in multiple cases; individual employ-
218 Id. at 3. For those who may be curious, the arbitrator in this case was Penn Payne, a
woman based in Georgia whose web site shows she has substantial experience as an attorney,
arbitrator, and mediator. PENN PAYNE LLC, https://www.pennpayne.com/profile, archived at
https://perma.cc/4LBM-V6YK (last visited June 24, 2018).
219 2018 AAA Employment LEXIS 18, at 3 n.3 (Feb. 23, 2018).
220 Id. at 23.
221 Id. at 25. The arbitrator was also reluctant to allow claimant to use evidence of
gendered dress expectations or environment (calling show a “boys club” and calling set a
“man cave” to prove her termination was due to gender discrimination). Id. at 32.
222 As previously noted, it is quite difficult to vacate arbitral awards and losing parties
may not even try to get an award vacated. See supra note 136.
223 While no party likes to lose, losing is far easier to take if the award seems consistent
with existing judicial precedents, rather than a creative expansion of existing law.
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ees may dispute only a single claim over the course of a lifetime and thus
have less market influence.224
Further, because arbitrators are hired privately they “have limited in-
centive to consider the effects of their awards on third parties,”225 such as on
the public. As Geraldine Moohr has explained, “[b]ecause their decisions
are final and limited to the purpose of resolving the immediate dispute, arbi-
trators have little motivation to explain their awards in a way that makes
them useful to future litigants or the general public.”226 These same incen-
tives may lead arbitrators to write relatively short decisions, if they provide
reasoned decisions at all. Parties are likely not eager to pay arbitrators’
hourly fees for scholarly opinions that are not necessary to resolve their own
disputes.227
While some scholars have suggested that this private focus might lead
arbitrators to refrain from following the law,228 others have found that arbi-
trators nonetheless likely do at least try to follow the law.229 Indeed, com-
mentators who have considered this matter in depth tend to be less
concerned that arbitrators will issue “lawless” decisions, and more con-
cerned that arbitrators will be “overly cautious and slavishly follow, rather
than distinguish, precedents.”230 As noted above, following existing prece-
dent closely may be seen as more defensible than making new law. One
224 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the “repeat arbitrator
phenomenon”).
225 Drahozal, supra note 184, at 192. R
226 Moohr, Goals, supra note 179, at 436. Similarly, the disputants who are hiring the
arbitrators are presumably interested in their own dispute, but not likely interested in paying
the arbitrator extra to write a more scholarly or innovative decision that might somehow aid
third parties.
227 See Moohr, Goals, supra note 179, at 457–59 (stating that parties are not likely to fund
law that seriously disadvantages them).
228 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbi-
tration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 725 (1999) (stating “arbitrators often do not apply the law”).
The idea is that arbitrators might care more about meeting the common-sense needs of dispu-
tants than strictly following legal requirements. Historically, arbitration was valued more for
expertise, expediency, and common-sense solutions than for legal reasons. See Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (observing that
historically businesses chose arbitration because it was different from litigation, offering ex-
pertise, confidentiality, and relative finality).
229 Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 449, 514 (2005) (“Now I imagine it is fair to say that arbitrators usually do try their
best to model their awards on what courts would do in similar cases––and that as often as not
they succeed in doing so. That is at least what the scanty empirical evidence seems to suggest,
and it corresponds as well to a plausible account of the likely nature of arbitrator incentives.
What courts and codes have previously said is a natural starting point, after all—while inertia
often does the rest—to the point that deciding in conformity with these rules of law will often
simply appear to the arbitrator to be the path of least resistance.”); see also Drahozal, supra
note 183, at 194 (agreeing that arbitrators most likely most often try to follow the law).
230 Moohr, Goals, supra note 179, at 436; see also Stephen A. Plass, Privatizing Antidis-
crimination Law with Arbitration: The Title VII Proof Problem, 68 MONT. L. REV. 151, 173
(2007) (urging that whereas courts have been willing to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support discrimination claims, arbitrators are less willing to do so and need to catch up with
courts’ approach).
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author explains that “because the prevailing party in an employment arbitra-
tion is likely to require judicial assistance to enforce the award, arbitrators
can be expected to draft awards that courts will perceive as legitimate.”231
Even if arbitrators were to issue scholarly decisions that advanced
novel, progressive interpretations of employment law, such decisions would
likely not have much precedential impact. The metaphor of the tree falling in
the forest is apt: assuming that an arbitrator were to write an opinion that
could potentially advance the law, it likely would not be seen by many peo-
ple. As has been discussed, arbitrator awards are not necessarily published;
when they are, the reality is they are not often read. Few reporters, lawyers,
or even law professors are likely to dig through decisions written by individ-
ual employment arbitrators, other than the arbitrator assigned to their partic-
ular case. Unlike judicial opinions, which often get attention in blogs,
newspaper articles, journals, and websites, arbitration decisions are also
rarely discussed in the media.232
Moreover, even if substantial arbitration decisions were to receive pub-
lic attention, they likely would not get much respect as potential precedent.
As noted, arbitration awards are not appealable on their merits233 and thus
will not lead to substantive appellate decisions from influential courts. The
EEOC identified this problem back in 1997, when it issued its Policy State-
ment on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Disputes as a Con-
dition of Employment.234 Stating that “arbitration, by its nature, does not
allow for the development of law,” the EEOC explained that as judicial
review of arbitral decisions “is limited to the narrowest of grounds,” “arbi-
tration affords no opportunity to build a jurisprudence through precedent.”235
Mark Weidemaier goes further to suggest that “[i]n employment arbitration
. . . efforts to create a system of arbitral precedent would . . . likely encounter
skepticism or hostility, especially in substantive domains [like statutory dis-
crimination claims] widely believed to be within the exclusive domain of
231 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1954 (2010) (arguing that arbitrators are not likely to create distinct
arbitral precedent).
232 This is something of a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Arbitration decisions are not
scoured and discussed because they are not deemed important. And, arbitration decisions are
not deemed significant in part because they are not regularly read and discussed.
233 The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to confirm arbitration awards, with very
few exceptions, and allows them to be vacated only in extreme circumstances. See supra note
136.
234 EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (1997), reprinted in 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E (July
11, 1997).
235 Id. at Section V(A)(2); see also Section IV(B) (discussing that the public nature of the
judicial process enables public higher courts and also Congress to ensure that employment
discrimination laws are properly interpreted and applied).
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public adjudicators.”236 Ultimately, as Geraldine Moohr puts it, “Congress
has not authorized arbitrators to develop the law.”237
Given these factors, mandatory arbitration deprives society of a forum
that can respond to social momentum and develop progressive laws.238 If
arbitrators do not typically issue progressive or innovative decisions, and if
any such decisions are not likely to be seen or cited, those members of our
society who are most in need of expanded legal protection will suffer most
from its absence under mandatory arbitration schemes. Whether they be ra-
cial or ethnic minorities, women, immigrants, transgender persons, older or
disabled persons, or part-time workers, those whose legal protections are
fragile or nonexistent stand to lose the most when arbitration is substituted
for litigation. This harm will fall not only upon those individual employees
who are actually covered by arbitration clauses, but also upon other workers
who might be indirectly impacted by the loss of progressive judicial
precedent.
Admittedly, the preceding argument contrasts arbitral decisions with
written judicial opinions, whereas juries, rather than judges, may ultimately
hear those litigated employment claims that make it all the way to trial. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991,239 for example, affords a jury trial to employees
who claim discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, or relig-
ion.240 Although arbitral decisions may not always be accompanied by sub-
stantial legal reasoning and may not be easy to access, they likely contain
more reasoning than a jury award, which has none. However, this argument
overlooks the fact that jury awards are often linked to judicial decisions that
do contain legal reasoning. Before a case makes it to the jury, a judge will
often issue a ruling on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.241 After
236 Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, supra note 230, at 1948; see
also id. at 1952 (“[E]mployment arbitrators in the United States are not likely to produce a
system of precedent because, in this context, arbitrators will lack lawmaking legitimacy.”). In
non-employment contexts arbitral decisions may also be scorned as precedent because arbitra-
tors need not be attorneys or have legal training. Moohr, Goals, supra note 179, at 435.
237 Moohr, Goals, supra note 179, at 435.
238 Taking decisions out of courts may also affect judges’ rulings when they do hear cases.
Myriam Gilles has warned that “[w]hen judges are no longer confronted regularly with the
civil claims of the poor . . . they will become unversed in and desensitized to the underlying
factual issues that affect lower-income groups.” Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disap-
pearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1561 (2016).
239 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
240 In a sexual harassment case, for example, a jury would ultimately decide whether the
work environment was “hostile” or “abusive” depending on “the frequency of the discrimina-
tory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offen-
sive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
241 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (reversing
district court grant of summary judgment, where district court had found Title VII did not give
rise to harassment claim by male employee regarding harassment by males); Hively v. Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (reversing district court grant of
motion to dismiss claim alleging discrimination against homosexual violates Title VII); Zarda
v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (reversing district court’s grant
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the case is heard by the jury, the trial court may rule on a motion to set aside
the jury’s verdict as a matter of law.242 An appellate court may be asked to
review the jury’s verdict243 or the jury instructions.244 Through these kinds of
decisions, judges spell out the meaning of our employment law, and these
kinds of decisions will disappear to the extent employment disputes are sent
to arbitration.
Further, the fact that most litigated cases are settled or decided on mo-
tions, rather than resolved at trial245 does not negate the argument that arbi-
tration stultifies progressive development of the law by denying plaintiffs
access to the courts. While it is true that the vast majority of litigated cases
are resolved before trial, judges do often issue many decisions along the
way. These decisions, on matters such as motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment, refine relevant law246 and influence the settlements that
are ultimately reached.247 When a dispute is handled in arbitration, by con-
trast, any such dispositive motions are handled by arbitrators and do not
ultimately get resolved by appellate courts.248
Does the preceding discussion reflect a real problem, or are these just
musings of an academic who has been battling mandatory arbitration for
of summary judgment to employer on ground that sexual orientation claims could not be
brought under Title VII); see generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Fed-
eral Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimi-
nation Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 549 (2010) (discussing that summary judgment motions
by defendants are more likely to be filed, and granted, in employment discrimination cases
than in other kinds of cases).
242 See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cty., No. 09-CV-2453, 2013 WL 6629054
(D. Md. Dec. 17, 2013) (rejecting defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that
would have overturned jury’s finding in favor of plaintiff on retaliation claim).
243 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Admin. of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 402 (5th Cir.
2000) (reviewing, and ultimately affirming, jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff on Title VII
retaliation claim).
244 See, e.g., Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing and reversing
trial court’s jury instruction in claim regarding hostile work environment).
245 During the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2018, 286,595 civil cases (exclud-
ing land condemnation) were filed in the U.S. District Courts. Court action only occurred in
234,655 cases. Of those, 202,397 were terminated or resolved before trial, and 29,745 were
terminated or resolved during or after the pretrial hearing. Further, of the remaining 2,513
cases, 807 were tried in bench trials, and 1,706 were tried by juries. Overall, 0.9% of the total
cases reached trial. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT
AND ACTION TAKEN—DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2018, http://www
.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31, archived at
https://perma.cc/D545-PGKZ.
246 See supra note 239.
247 As with litigated disputes, many arbitration matters settle, but the settlements in the
two arenas will likely be different, reflecting the fact that an employee who does not settle in
litigation will have a better chance of prevailing and recovering more relief than would an
otherwise similarly situated employee in arbitration. Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra
note 26, at 1322 & n. 87; see also Colvin, Empirical, supra note 165, at 6 (observing that R
differences in settlement practices between litigation and arbitration may either depress or
increase the arbitration win rate relative to litigation).
248 See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1327.
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over twenty years? Let us look to the powerful #MeToo movement to see
how these issues are playing out today in court and in arbitration.
III. #METOO—AN ILLUSTRATION OF HOW MANDATORY ARBITRATION
STYMIES PROGRESS TOWARDS JUSTICE
A. The #MeToo Revelations as a Social Movement
The #MeToo movement is, without doubt, a powerful social phenome-
non. When the New York Times and New Yorker magazine suddenly exposed
the alleged sexual transgressions of movie mogul Harvey Weinstein,249 ac-
tress Alyssa Milano posted a tweet calling upon victims to reveal if they too
had been sexually harassed or assaulted.250 Within twenty-four hours the
#MeToo hashtag had been used 500,000 times.251 The power of the resulting
movement led Time magazine to name the “silence breakers” of the
#MeToo movement Time’s Person of the Year for 2017.252
249 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accus-
ers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-
weinstein-harassment-allegations.html, archived at https://perma.cc/Q4NZ-J2MS; Ronan Far-
row, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their
Stories, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-ag
gressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories, archived at
https://perma.cc/AA7M-VQKU.
250 Margaret Renkl, The Raw Power of #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2017, https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/the-raw-power-of-metoo.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
23N8-RGK2.
251 Id. Ten years prior, Tarana Burke initiated a “Me Too” movement focused on women
of color and other marginalized people. Zenobia Jeffries, Me Too Creator Tarana Burke Re-
minds Us This Is About Black and Brown Survivors, YES! MAGAZINE, Jan. 4, 2018, https://
www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/me-too-creator-tarana-burke-reminds-us-this-is-about-
black-and-brown-survivors-20180104, archived at https://perma.cc/R6JU-M9Q2; see also
Abby Olhaiser, The Woman Behind Me Too Knew the Power of the Phrase When She Created
It 10 Years Ago, DENV. POST, Oct. 19, 2017, https://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/19/metoo-
woman-sexual-harassment-assault/, archived at https://perma.cc/X32J-3J24.
252 Stephanie Zacharek et al., Time Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME,
Dec. 18, 2017, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers, archived at
https://perma.cc/SN6F-EPVG. Although the #MeToo movement has primarily focused on
claims brought by women against men, it is important to remember that some of the harass-
ment allegations have been brought by men or boys against men. See, e.g., Isabel Vincent &
Melissa Klein, Legendary Opera Conductor Molested Teen for Years: Police Report, N.Y.
POST, Dec. 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/legendary-opera-conductor-molested-teen-
for-years-police-report/, archived at https://perma.cc/PG2R-JAEA; Lauren Holter, Anthony
Rapp’s Claims Against Kevin Spacey Are a Reminder that Sexual Assault Happens to Men,
Too, BUSTLE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/anthony-rapps-claims-against-kevin-
spacey-are-a-reminder-that-sexual-assault-happens-to-men-too-3067274, archived at https://
perma.cc/FK98-THNK. Despite Michael Crichton’s book Disclosure and the subsequent
movie, telling the story of a woman boss harassing a male subordinate, it is rare for men to
bring claims against women. See Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment
in Organizations: A Decade of Research in Review, in 1 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 476 (J. Barling & C.L. Cooper eds., 2008). But see Zoe Greenberg,
What Happens to #MeToo When a Feminist is the Accused?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2018, https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/nyregion/sexual-harassment-nyu-female-professor.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/VC23-GM58; Jacey Fortin, Accused of Sexual Harassment, An-
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The #MeToo movement has had broad implications throughout the
world.253 Harvey Weinstein has been arrested and charged with various
counts of sexual assault.254 We have seen the firing, resignation, or embar-
rassment of leading men in the world of Hollywood,255 politics,256 news me-
dia,257 cooking,258 technology,259 entertainment,260 the armed forces,261 law,262
drea Ramsey Ends Kansas Congressional Run, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2017, https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/12/15/us/andrea-ramsey-harassment.html, archived at https://perma.cc/K2B9-
CCHG.
253 See Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global Moment: The Anatomy of a Viral Cam-
paign, CNN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoo-hashtag-global-
movement/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/56VK-5LQ3; Catherine Powell, How
#MeToo Has Spread Like Wildfire Around the World, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2017, http://www
.newsweek.com/how-metoo-has-spread-wildfire-around-world-749171, archived at https://per
ma.cc/4HWV-C5F4.
254 Maya Salam, Harvey Weinstein’s Arrest Comes After Months Long Downward Spiral,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/us/harvey-weinstein-charges
.html, archived at https://perma.cc/MM2T-XHV3.
255 Eric Levinson & Aaron Cooper, Bill Cosby Guilty on All Three Counts in Indecent
Assault Trial, CNN (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/26/us/bill-cosby-trial/index
.html, archived at https://perma.cc/R3Y5-SGDM; Mark Kennedy, ‘House of Cards’ Cancelled
Amid Kevin Spacey Sexual Assault Allegations, THE STAR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.thestar
.com/entertainment/2017/10/30/kevin-spacey-apologizes-after-allegations-by-tv-actor-anthon
y-rapp.html, archived at https://perma.cc/V6AU-SBGM.
256 Matt Ford, The 19 Women Who Accused President Trump of Sexual Misconduct, THE
ATLANTIC, Dec. 7, 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/what-about-the-
19-women-who-accused-trump/547724/, archived at https://perma.cc/Y3ZG-38EG; Dan Mer-
ica, Women Detail Sexual Allegations Against Trump, CNN, (May 10, 2018), https://www.cnn
.com/2017/12/11/politics/donald-trump-women-allegations/index.html, archived at https://per
ma.cc/RE5X-V7VS; Meghan Keneally, Sen. Al Franken’s Accusers and the Allegations
Against Him, ABC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/US/sen-al-frankens-accus
ers-accusations-made/story?id=51406862, archived at https://perma.cc/3G5N-LWGN; James
Salzer, Lobbyist Files Sexual Harassment Complaint Against Georgia Lawmaker, POLITICALLY
GEORGIA (Mar. 9, 2018), https://politics.myajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lobby
ist-files-sexual-harassment-complaint-against-georgia-lawmaker/ERcsb7xkuU8PrRA6q3wv5
L/, archived at https://perma.cc/5JGD-CBF7.
257 Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Anchor Ousted at Fox News Accuses Chief of
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2016; John Koblin, Emily Steel & Jim Rutenberg, As Accusa-
tions Build, Murdoch Ushers Ailes Out at Fox News, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2016; Sydney Em-
ber, Michael Oreskes Quits NPR Amid Sexual Harassment Accusations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/business/media/mike-oreskes-npr-sexual-harass-
ment.html, archived at https://perma.cc/66ZA-FXN3; Maya Salam, Minnesota Public Radio
Drops Garrison Keillor Over Allegations of Improper Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/media/garrison-keillor-fired.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/88LQ-83SL.
258 Kim Severson, After Apologies, Restaurants Struggle to Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/dining/restaurants-sexual-harassment.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/KD6N-VWQ6 (discussing accusations against chef Mario Batali).
259 Richard Morgan, Uber CEO Takes Leave of Absence Amid Sexual Harassment Scan-
dal, N.Y. POST, June 13, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/06/13/uber-ceo-takes-leave-of-ab-
sence-amid-sexual-harassment-scandal/, archived at https://perma.cc/L6YL-57TA.
260 Lisa Respers France, Louis C.K. Accused of Sexual Misconduct in Bombshell Report,
CNN (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/entertainment/louis-ck-sexual-mis
conduct/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/6R7F-3HHY.
261 See, e.g., Thomas James Brennan, Hundreds of Marines Investigated for Sharing
Photos of Naked Colleagues, REVEAL NEWS FROM THE CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/blog/hundreds-of-marines-investigated-for-shar
ing-photos-of-naked-colleagues/, archived at https://perma.cc/3JPG-V7HY.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-1\HLC105.txt unknown Seq: 41 13-MAR-19 10:57
2019] Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress 195
and many other contexts.263 Oprah Winfrey announced at the Golden Globes
Ceremony that “a new day is on the horizon.”264 While the #MeToo move-
ment has relied extensively on social media and public demonstrations of
alliance, it has also achieved institutional support. January 1, 2018 marked
the founding of the Time’s Up Initiative, which created a legal defense fund
that provides subsidized legal aid to victims of sexual abuse in the work-
place.265 The fund is managed by the National Women’s Law Center, and it
has expanded its mission more broadly to “address[ ] the systemic inequal-
ity and injustice in the workplace that have kept underrepresented groups
from reaching their full potential.”266 Within its first five weeks of existence,
Time’s Up raised $20 million.267
Yet questions remain as to whether this powerful social movement will
make meaningful changes in all kinds of workplaces. Many of the loudest
voices in the #MeToo movement are celebrities who can galvanize the sup-
port of thousands of people with the click of a button. In contrast, victims
who are farmworkers,268 hotel workers,269 autoworkers,270 sportswear execu-
262 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of
Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nation
al-security/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/
12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term=.4426209350ef,
archived at https://perma.cc/ENB7-U8ZK.
263 A list compiled in late February 2018 is already out of date. Post-Weinstein, These Are
the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment Allegations, GLAMOUR (Feb. 26, 2018), https://
www.glamour.com/gallery/post-weinstein-these-are-the-powerful-men-facing-sexual-harass-
ment-allegations, archived at https://perma.cc/P7RV-CV58.
264 Sophie Gilbert & Tori Latham, Full Transcript: Oprah Winfrey’s Speech at the Golden
Globes, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2018/01/full-transcript-oprah-winfreys-speech-at-the-golden-globes/549905/, archived at
https://perma.cc/MJT9-RD4L; see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo and Law’s Limita-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2018, at A19 (“The #MeToo movement is accomplishing what
sexual harassment law to date has not.”).
265 TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/2K6U-H4F2.
266 TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/#ourmission-anchor, archived at https://per
ma.cc/7JNJ-WE4W; see also Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the
Difference Between the 2 Movements––And How They’re Alike, http://time.com/5189945/
whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/, archived at https://perma
.cc/P5LT-DVZM (updated Mar. 22, 2018, originally published Mar. 8, 2018).
267 Natalie Robehmed, With $20 Million Raised, Time’s Up Seek ‘Equity and Safety’ in the
Workplace, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2018/02/06/
with-20-million-raised-times-up-seeks-equity-and-safety-in-the-workplace/#6c0ac277103c,
archived at https://perma.cc/AD6M-5M8Q.
268 See, e.g., Time Staff, 700,000 Female Farmworkers Say They Stand With Hollywood
Actors Against Sexual Assault, TIME (Nov. 10, 2017), http://time.com/5018813/farmworkers-
solidarity-hollywood-sexual-assault/, archived at https://perma.cc/D3NZ-VUNN.
269 See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, ‘He was Masturbating . . . I Felt like Crying’: What House-
keepers Endure to Clean Hotel Rooms, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.huf
fingtonpost.com/entry/housekeeper-hotel-sexual-harassment_us_5a0f438ce4b0e97dffed3443,
archived at https://perma.cc/PX2D-M523.
270 See, e.g., Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of
Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/inter-
active/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
2FRS-M2TN.
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tives,271 tech experts,272 or provide security in airports273 may not find that the
#MeToo movement works immediately or easily to rid their workplaces of
sexual harassment.274 They may, instead, need the help of the law and of
lawyers.
B. The Law of Sexual Harassment Has Not Caught Up to #MeToo
While public opinion is waxing strongly against sexual harassment and
inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace, the law of sexual harassment
has not caught up with this trend. At least not yet. Many of the actions and
comments that have led to resignations, terminations, and public opprobrium
would likely not produce legal liability under existing precedent.275 As nu-
merous excellent scholars have already discussed this issue in depth,276 this
271 See, e.g., Julie Creswell et al., At Nike, Revolt Led by Women Leads to Exodus of Male
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/28/business/nike-
women.html, archived at https://perma.cc/YP5D-LJB2 (detailing that while a number of male
executives were eventually pushed out at Nike, it took a great deal of time and many failed
efforts).
272 See generally EMILY CHANG, BROTOPIA: BREAKING UP THE BOYS’ CLUB OF SILICON
VALLEY (2018).
273 This American Life: LaDonna, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (May 25, 2018), https://www
.thisamericanlife.org/647/ladonna, archived at https://perma.cc/ZX3W-Z325 (telling the story
of an airport security worker who endured substantial sexual harassment over a lengthy period
of time).
274 Although much of the empirical sexual harassment literature has focused on White/
European American women, it may be that other groups are harassed in equal or greater num-
bers, and reporting behavior may also vary across racial and gender lines. See EEOC SELECT
TASK FORCE, supra note 204, at 11 (citing Tamara A. Bruce, Racial and Ethnic Harassment in
the Workplace, in GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN THE WORKPLACE: ISSUES AND CHAL-
LENGES FOR TODAY’S ORGANIZATIONS (Margaret Foegen Karsten, M. ed., 2006)). See also
Cortina & Berdahl, supra note 251, at 477 (reporting a lack of definitive information on these
issues). We also lack good empirical information on harassment experienced by members of
the LGBT community. EEOC SELECT TASK FORCE, supra note 204, at 10–11 (summarizing an
array of studies showing at least 35% of openly LGBT persons reported being harassed at
work, with transgender persons reporting even higher rates of harassment).
275 For example, Minnesota Senator Al Franken was compelled to resign his seat for alleg-
edly forcibly kissing a radio news anchor and subsequently groping her on an airplane. Phil
McCausland, Sen. Al Franken ‘Embarassed and Ashamed’ Following Sexual Harassment Alle-
gations, NBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/sen-al-
franken-embarrassed-ashamed-following-sexual-harassment-allegations-n824026, archived at
https://perma.cc/9WVP-945N. New York Times reporter Glenn Thrush was suspended after
four women came forward, alleging that Thrush kissed and touched them without their con-
sent. Sydney Ember, Glenn Thrush, New York Times Reporter, Accused of Sexual Misconduct,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/business/media/glenn-
thrush-sexual-misconduct.html, archived at https://perma.cc/XBG2-XQEV. Yet, as will be
seen, unauthorized touching or even kissing is not necessarily sufficient to support a claim for
sexual harassment under federal law. See infra notes 278–287 and accompanying text. R
276 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Dis-
crimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018); Elizabeth C. Tippett, The
Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manu-
script at 9); Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE (2018); Kate Webber Nunez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of
Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 463 (2018); see also
Sandra F. Sperino and Suja A. Thomas, When Harassment Isn’t Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
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Article will lightly cover the subject as background to the arbitration
discussion.277
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governs claims for sexual
harassment under federal law.278 Under this law, to prevail on a claim that
inappropriate comments or physical contact created a “hostile work environ-
ment,”279 the plaintiff must show that the conduct was more than “merely
offensive.”280 Rather, such conduct must be “severe and pervasive,” “un-
welcome,”281 and “because of sex.”282 Although this may not sound like too
high a standard, the law books are replete with cases that apply these stan-
dards in an extremely demanding fashion to reject claims many #MeToo
activists would have assumed constitute sexual harassment. For example,
affirming a grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environ-
ment claim, the Eighth Circuit discussed multiple prior decisions in which
plaintiffs failed to prove a hostile work environment despite seemingly
favorable evidence. In the first case plaintiff had “evidence that a supervisor
sexually propositioned her, repeatedly touched her hand, requested that she
draw an image of a phallic object to demonstrate her qualification for a posi-
29, 2017, at A31 (observing that “courts routinely dismiss cases brought by workers who
claim their supervisors propositioned them, kissed them or grabbed their breasts”); Catherine
A. MacKinnon, #MeToo and Law’s Limitations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2018, at A19; Yuki Nogu-
chi, Sexual Harassment Cases Often Rejected by Courts, NPR (Nov. 28, 2017, 7:28 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/28/565743374/sexual-harassment-cases-often-rejected-by-courts,
archived at https://perma.cc/5AEW-QVUG.
277 Both the Stanford Law Review and the Yale Law Journal recently published online
symposia devoted to the implications of the #MeToo movement for sexual harassment law. See
generally #MeToo and the Future of Sexual Harassment Law, https://www.stanfordlawreview
.org/metoo-symposium/, archived at https://perma.cc/UGA2-TFR7; #MeToo and the Future of
Sexual Harassment Law, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/collection/MeToo, archived at https:/
/perma.cc/R8TB-EYA7.
278 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq. While alleged victims can potentially state claims under
state statutes or common law as well, depending on the circumstances, this analysis will focus
on claims brought under federal law.
279 As has already been discussed in this Article, see supra notes 53–60 and accompany- R
ing text, even the recognition of hostile environment claims was a significant advance in the
interpretation of Title VII, as for some time prior courts viewed supervisors’ insistence that
subordinates sleep with them or be fired as mere personal conduct, rather than workplace
discrimination. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 1701–04. R
Note that sexual harassment claims can also potentially be brought where the plaintiff alleges
sex was demanded as a quid pro quo for obtaining or retaining the job or employment benefits.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). However, those cases can also be
very hard to win because courts often find alleged conduct has not affected the plaintiff’s
“employment benefits.” See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 679 (E.D. Ark. 1998)
(finding that, even assuming Clinton engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with Paula
Jones, Jones could not prevail on claims either that the conduct was a quid pro quo for employ-
ment or that she had suffered employment detriments).
280 Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
281 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67–68 (“For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an
abusive working environment.’”).
282 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998) (finding that same sex
harassing conduct can only violate Title VII if it is “because of” sex, and that Title VII is not a
“general civility code”).
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tion, displayed a poster portraying the plaintiff as ‘the president and CEO of
the Man Hater’s Club of America,’ and asked her to type a copy of a
‘He–Men Women Hater’s Club’ manifesto.”283 In the second case, “a super-
visor had rubbed an employee’s back and shoulders, called her ‘baby doll,’
‘accus[ed] her of not wanting to be “one of [his] girls,”’ suggested once in
a long-distance phone call ‘that she should be in bed with him,’ and ‘in-
sinuat[ed] that she could go farther in the company if she got along with
him.’” 284 Then, in the third cited case, the court had ruled that a plaintiff
“had not established actionable harassment” even though he “asserted that a
harasser asked him to watch pornographic movies and to masturbate to-
gether, suggested that the plaintiff would advance professionally if the plain-
tiff caused the harasser to orgasm, kissed the plaintiff on the mouth,
‘grabbed’ the plaintiff’s buttocks, ‘brush[ed]’ the plaintiff’s groin, ‘reached
for’ the plaintiff’s genitals, and ‘briefly gripped’ the plaintiff’s thigh.”285 Con-
sidering all of this precedent, the Eighth Circuit in 2013 similarly found the
trial court had not erred in granting summary judgment to defendant on
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, even though plaintiff provided
evidence that her supervisor had put his arms around her on two occasions,
kissed her face, and demanded she use tweezers to remove an ingrown facial
hair from his chin.286 Nor is the Eighth Circuit uniquely hostile to sexual
harassment claims; other jurisdictions have issued plenty of similar
decisions.287
In addition to facing an uphill battle to show that alleged conduct is
“severe,” “pervasive,” and “unwelcome,” plaintiffs in sexual harassment
cases face other significant hurdles due to courts’ interpretations of Title VII.
For example, plaintiffs will fail if they complain about sexual harassment
283 McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Duncan v.
General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 931–35 (8th Cir. 2002)) (affirming grant of summary
judgment on hostile work environment claim but remanding for consideration of quid pro quo
harassment claim).
284 McMiller, 758 F.3d at 188–89 (quoting Anderson v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ark., Inc.,
579 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2009)).
285 Id. at 189 (quoting LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. and Hum. Serv., 394 F.3d 1098,
1100–03 (8th Cir. 2005)).
286 Id. at 188 (affirming grant of summary judgment on hostile work environment claim
but remanding for consideration of quid pro quo harassment claim).
287 See, e.g., Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 309 F. App’x 825, 829 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that single instances of offensive touching including supervisor rubbing pelvic region
against employee’s hips and buttocks and touching employee’s stomach and wrist are not ob-
jectively offensive or severe enough to support a claim of sexual harassment); Bowman v.
Shawnee St. Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for a
woman accused of sexually harassing a male employee in part because the abuse was not
pervasive enough, even though woman had rubbed male employee’s shoulder, grabbed his
buttocks, and made sexually charged comments); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d
353, 361–62 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and four “iso-
lated” incidents of touching of the hand, arm and buttocks by another co-worker did not con-
stitute severe and pervasive sexual harassment). See also SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A.
THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 32–40
(2017).
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either too soon288 or too late.289 Also, the Supreme Court has issued two
decisions that allow companies to elude liability in sexual harassment cases
as long as they can show that they took reasonable steps to prevent and
correct any hostile work environment (for example, by instituting a training
program) and that the victim failed to take advantage of internal mechanisms
designed to prevent harassment.290 Case law also makes it very difficult for
sexual harassment victims to prove that any negative employment conse-
quences were caused by gender-related harassment.291
Also, while Title VII proscribes retaliation against those who complain
of sexual harassment or other forms of discrimination,292 courts’ interpreta-
tions of Title VII have also made it tough for plaintiffs to win these claims.293
Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims fail, for example, if the initial conduct com-
plained of was not sufficiently egregious,294 if the plaintiff cannot show a
288 A claim is essentially brought too soon if the employee has complained of conduct that
the court ultimately finds was not sufficiently severe to count as “severe and pervasive” under
Title VII. For example, Kate Nunez explains that much of the conduct endured by female
reporters at Fox News might not have been sufficient to support a legal claim. Nunez, supra
note 275, at 493.
289 It is easy to file too late, as plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within either 180 or 300 days of at least one of
the acts of which they complain, depending upon the jurisdiction. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). This time period can be quite short, particularly if a
victim is agonizing over whether filing a complaint may further harm her employment situa-
tion or prospects. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir.
2007) (finding plaintiff’s claim was untimely where she waited three and a half months to
report the conduct, even though she delayed “because she feared being fired and felt that
silence would best serve her career interests”).
290 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013) (holding that an employee is a
“supervisor,” whose actions potentially make an employer vicariously liable, only when the
employer has empowered that harassing employee to take tangible employment actions against
the victim); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that employers
are subject to vicarious liability for supervisors’ sexual harassment, but are able to assert an
affirmative defense that the employer’s conduct was reasonable in attempting to prevent har-
assment of which the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage).
291 Alleged victims face multiple problems in proving causation. They must show that any
alleged negative employment consequences were attributable to harassment, and they must
also prove that the nature of the harassment was attributable to sex. See David S. Schwartz,
When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1697, 1703 (2002).
292 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
293 See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/ending-harassment-by-
starting-with-retaliation/, archived at https://perma.cc/LA58-8F9X.
294 See, e.g., Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 709 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(affirming grant of summary judgment on retaliation claim because “no reasonable employee
could believe that the conduct about which she complained amounted to a hostile work envi-
ronment under Title VII”). Most courts do not require that the complained of conduct be
unlawful, so long as the employee reasonably and in good faith believed it to be unlawful. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., 819 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 2016). However, the Supreme
Court has left open the possibility that perhaps retaliation protection is afforded only where the
conduct is actually unlawful. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001);
see generally Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 924 (2008) (retaliation claim fails if harassment is not
sufficiently severe).
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materially adverse employment action was taken against her,295 or if the
plaintiff cannot sufficiently prove a causal relationship between her com-
plaints and any action taken against her.296 Former Fox News anchor Megyn
Kelly explained the dilemma faced by many victims:
I knew the reality of the situation: if I caused a stink, my career
would likely be over. Sure they might investigate, but I felt certain
there was no way they would get rid of him, and I would be left on
the wrong side of the one man who had power at Fox. I’d get la-
beled a troublemaker, someone who is overly sensitive—all the
things we too often hear about women who don’t tolerate harass-
ment. I didn’t want any of that. I just wanted to do my job.297
In short, these cases demonstrate that the law of sexual harassment is
not yet in sync with the notions of justice demanded by the #MeToo social
movement. Still, a number of commentators have expressed hope that the
#MeToo social movement will eventually encourage courts to interpret sex-
ual harassment law more sympathetically to victims.298 As Rebecca Hanner
White has emphasized:
A law’s interpretation can shift and change over time, and it is
possible that the #MeToo movement will lead judges (and juries
should a case proceed past summary judgment to trial) to think
differently, and more empathetically, about how workplace harass-
ment affects women and to assess whether it is actionable
accordingly.299
Sandra Sperino and Suja Thomas have similarly expressed hope that the
#MeToo movement will encourage judges to rethink earlier cases that have
led them to dismiss so many claims of harassment as not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to be legally cognizable:
In the early and mid-1990s, the federal courts wrestled with the
meaning of the “severe or pervasive” standard, and judges during
that period created a very high bar for plaintiffs to meet. Unlike
typical workers, these judges had lifelong job security and power-
295 See, e.g., Higgins v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 578, 585–86, 590 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that
withholding of mentoring is not a sufficiently materially adverse act to count as retaliation
under Title VII).
296 See Nunez, supra note 276, at 484–85 (discussing difficulty in proving causation in R
retaliation claims under Title VII).
297 MEGYN KELLY, SETTLE FOR MORE 302 (2016) (discussing why Kelly did not file a
formal complaint against Roger Ailes).
298 Of course commentators also hope that the #MeToo movement will lead judges and
others to better understand the factual perspective of alleged victims, and to more frequently
believe their accounts, in addition to interpreting the law more favorably.
299 White, supra note 276, at 3. White quotes Professor Deborah Rhode as stating: “Often R
times it takes a kind of cultural consciousness raising moment like the one that we’re having
now to force a reevaluation of standards.” Id. at 3 n.9.
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ful positions. They also did not have the benefit of deliberating
with a large group of people with different experiences as a jury
does. These early cases have cast a long shadow, and today, some
judges appear to simply be following the standards set by earlier
courts. These standards have not aged well.300
Catherine MacKinnon also expresses optimism: “[s]exual harassment law
can grow with #MeToo. Taking #MeToo’s changing norms into the law
could—and predictably will—transform the law as well.”301
There are early signs that the #MeToo movement is already beginning
to have some influence on judges. In a recent decision, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision granting summary judgment
to the employer in a sexual harassment case, holding that a jury must be
given a chance to opine on whether the employee acted reasonably when she
failed to report the sexual harassment through an internal reporting mecha-
nism.302 The court specifically alluded to the #MeToo movement in its analy-
sis, stating “[t]his appeal comes to us in the midst of national news
regarding a veritable firestorm of allegations of rampant sexual misconduct
that has been closeted for years, not reported by victims.”303 In particular,
the court found that while Supreme Court case law generally protects em-
ployers from liability when employees fail to timely report their claims, re-
cent news stories and studies show that the failure to report is widespread
and can be justifiable.304 This is a clear example of how social movements
can impact the development of law. Unfortunately, however, given the arbi-
tration landscape discussed in this Article and applied to the sexual harass-
ment context below, these moments of judicial reinterpretation in the area of
sexual harassment may be few and far between. Many judges may not even
get a chance to rethink these older standards.
C. Arbitration Clauses and the #MeToo Movement
Arbitration clauses are already significantly constraining the claims that
might have arisen out of the #MeToo movement, thereby stagnating the de-
velopment of sexual harassment law. In 2016, then Fox News star Gretchen
Carlson filed a complaint against Roger Ailes, at that time Chairman and
CEO of Fox News, in New Jersey Superior Court.305 Carlson alleged that
Ailes had made numerous inappropriate comments and sexual advances, and
also retaliated against her for complaining about her co-host’s sexist behav-
300 Sperino & Thomas, supra note 276, at A31. R
301 MacKinnon, supra note 275, at A19.
302 Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 306 (3rd Cir. 2018).
303 Id. at 313 n.12.
304 Id.
305 Nunez, supra note 276, at 467; Complaint and Jury Demand, Carlson v. Ailes, No. R
2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 6, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2941030/
Carlson-Complaint-Filed.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/X5UJ-DMEL.
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ior.306 It is likely that Carlson sued only Ailes, and not Fox News itself, in an
effort to elude the arbitration clause contained in her contract,307 but Ailes
still sought to have the lawsuit dismissed so that any issues would be re-
solved in arbitration.308 Ultimately, because Fox News and Carlson settled,
the courts did not decide whether the claim would have been heard in arbi-
tration rather than litigation.309 However, when another Fox News host, An-
drea Tantaros, brought a sexual harassment lawsuit against Roger Ailes,
Ailes and the other defendants won a motion in court relegating the matter to
confidential arbitration.310 Fox News ultimately settled these and other
claims and eventually terminated alleged perpetrators Bill O’Reilly and
Roger Ailes,311 but only after the allegations received substantial public at-
tention and a public outcry led advertisers to withdraw sponsorships.312
The link between sexual harassment and mandatory arbitration has also
gained a lot of attention in the tech world. Susan Fowler, who wrote a now
famous blog blowing the whistle on sexual harassment committed against
female engineers at Uber,313 has also been extremely active in drawing the
connection between ongoing sexual harassment and forced arbitration. For
example, Fowler filed an amicus curiae brief in Epic Systems, urging that the
Supreme Court prohibit companies from using forced arbitration to prevent
employees from bringing group or class claims.314 In the brief, Fowler ex-
plains that she, like hundreds of thousands of other Uber workers, was re-
quired to sign an arbitration provision including a class action waiver.315 She
also notes that many other tech companies, including Google and Facebook,
require their workers to agree to arbitration including class action waivers.316
Fowler urges that taking away the class action from tech workers is particu-
larly harmful because, in the “gig economy,” workers realistically lack other
economic weapons of concerted action such as the strike or picket line.317
306 Nunez, supra note 276, at 467–68. R
307 Id. at 469.
308 John Koblin, Lawyers for Fox News Chairman Want Harassment Suit in Arbitration,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2016, at B6.
309 Nunez, supra note 276, at 469–70. R
310 Id. at 471–72.
311 Id. at 465. Emily Steel & Michael Schmidt, Fox News Ousts O’Reilly, A Host Central
to Its Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2017, at A1.
312 Nunez, supra note 276, at 465. See also Jim Dwyer, Ex-Host Charges Fox News with R
Retaliation for Harassment Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2016, at B3; Michael M.
Grynbaum & John Koblin, Anchor Ousted at Fox News Accuses Chief of Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2016, at A1.
313 Susan J. Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN J. FOWLER
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one-very-
strange-year-at-uber, archived at https://perma.cc/ML5C-EC2Z; see also Mike Isaac, Uber
Fires 20 Amid Investigation into Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2017, at A1.
314 Brief for Susan Fowler as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (No. 16-285), 2017 WL 4325881, at *2–3.
315 Id. at *2, *5–6.
316 Id. at *7 n. 8.
317 Id. at *9 (explaining that workers who do not come into a physical office have fewer
opportunities to do old-fashioned picketing or engage in other kinds of concerted activity).
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Fowler has also been working with the California Labor Federation in sup-
port of a proposed California statute intended to block forced arbitration.318
She has stated, “[f]orced arbitration is a kind of legal loophole that these
companies could use—companies like Uber—to cover up illegal behav-
ior.”319 And Ms. Fowler also wrote an op-ed for the New York Times urging
that Congress adopt legislation ending the use of mandatory arbitration to
block sexual harassment claims.320
While employees in certain high profile industries may be reasonably
well positioned to gain substantial attention for their claims despite being
covered by private arbitration clauses, most employees do not have this ad-
vantage of a public platform to raise these issues. News media realistically
cannot and will not give coverage to most allegations of sexual or other
misconduct brought by lower level employees in businesses throughout the
economy. For this reason, a number of advocates, including Gretchen Carl-
son herself, have urged companies throughout the economy to stop forcing
their employees into arbitration. She tweeted: “EVERY organization should
end forced arbitration because keeping victims silent is how sexual predators
can get away with it for years (or decades).”321
Other advocates have similarly drawn a direct connection between sex-
ual harassment and binding arbitration clauses, demanding that companies
change their practices.322 For example, actress Reese Witherspoon, who has
been speaking out about sexist behavior in Hollywood, has stated, “[n]o
more forced arbitration agreements for sexual harassment cases makes a
safer work environment.”323 Numerous advocacy organizations joined to-
gether to write a letter to Google in February 2018 urging that company “to
end the use of forced arbitration provisions in your employee contracts and
to restore your employees’ rights to access the court system after disputes
318 Johana Bhuiyan, Susan Fowler’s Next Act: Ending Forced Arbitration, Which Blocks
Workers from Suing Their Employers, RECODE (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/
4/18/17252032/susan-fowler-uber-forced-arbitration-labor-bill-california, archived at https://
perma.cc/89C9-2MYG.
319 Id.
320 Susan Fowler, I Wrote the Uber Memo. This is How to End Sexual Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/opinion/metoo-susan-fowler-forc
ed-arbitration.html, archived at http://perma.cc/86KA-BZB4.
321 Danielle Paquette, Microsoft Just Handed #MeToo a Major Victory, WASH. POST, Dec.
20, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/20/microsoft-just-handed-
metoo-a-major-victory/?utm_term=.1543045cdc7e, archived at https://perma.cc/S2KT-NU52.
322 As will be discussed, advocates including more than fifty attorneys general have also
asked Congress to protect victims of sexual harassment by passing legislation to limit compa-
nies’ use of forced arbitration. See infra notes 346–347 and accompanying text; see also Jacob R
Gershman, As More Companies Demand Arbitration Agreements, Sexual Harassment Claims
Fizzle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-more-employees-sign-arbi
tration-agreements-sexual-harassment-claims-fizzle-1516876201, archived at https://perma.cc/
UH37-QR3B.
323 Paquette, supra note 321. R
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arise with your company.”324 Also, Gizmodo asked ten major tech compa-
nies to ban forced arbitration in order to fight sexual harassment in Silicon
Valley.325
In a few instances, companies have agreed to act in the public interest
(or have given in to public shaming, depending on one’s degree of cynicism)
to abolish forced arbitration for certain types of claims. Microsoft ended its
use of forced arbitration clauses with respect to sexual harassment claims in
December 2017.326 Similarly, Uber and Lyft have now ended forced arbitra-
tion of sexual harassment and assault claims by employees, drivers, or cus-
tomers, though Uber still blocks class actions in both arbitration and
litigation.327 Meanwhile, several major law firms agreed to stop using forced
arbitration to require summer associates and others to arbitrate sexual har-
assment and other claims, after a Harvard Law School Lecturer tweeted
about the clauses.328 Heightening the pressure, fourteen top law schools have
asked law firms that interview on campus to disclose whether or not they
plan to require summer associates to agree to arbitration.329
While social pressure has been effective in the aforementioned con-
texts, many and likely most companies still force sexual harassment victims
and other employees to bring any claims they may have in arbitration, rather
324 Letter from more than forty public interest organizations to Larry Page (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/employment_arb_sign-on_letter_google.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/3AFV-HE83.
325 Melanie Ehrenkranz, Silicon Valley Needs to Ban Forced-Arbitration Agreements. We
Asked 10 Tech Companies if They Will, GIZMODO (Feb. 9, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/silicon-
valley-needs-to-ban-forced-arbitration-agreemen-1822313732, archived at https://perma.cc/
2ERP-NC2S.
326 Brad Smith, Microsoft Endorses Senate Bill to Address Sexual Harassment,
MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 19, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/
microsoft-endorses-senate-bill-address-sexual-harassment/, archived at https://perma.cc/
N7BH-3AE3 (blog from Microsoft President Brad Smith stating “we are waiving the contrac-
tual requirement for arbitration of sexual harassment claims in our own arbitration agreements
for the limited number of employees who have this requirement”); Paquette, supra note 321. R
Microsoft also announced its support of a proposed federal law, discussed infra note 346, that
would bar most companies from employing forced arbitration in employment cases. Smith,
Microsoft Endorses, supra.
327 Staff, Uber and Lyft End Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment and Assault Claims,
CEB GLOBAL (May 15, 2018), https://www.cebglobal.com/talentdaily/uber-ends-forced-arbi-
tration-of-sexual-harassment-claims-pledges-transparency/, archived at https://perma.cc/
TVA2-PYED.
328 See Debra Cassens Weiss, After Social Media Outcry, Munger Tolles Will No Longer
Require Mandatory Arbitration, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 26, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/after_social_media_outcry_muner_tolles_will_no_longer_require_mandatory_arb,
archived at https://perma.cc/AA9C-DU7K. See also Stephanie Francis Ward, Orrick Follows
Munger Tolles in Dropping Mandatory Arbitration Agreements: Will More Firms Follow?,
A.B.A. J. (Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/orrick_follows_munger_
tolles_in_dropping_mandatory_arbitration, archived at https://perma.cc/WKT2-DC8D.
329 Meghan Tribe, Top Law Schools Ask Firms to Disclose Summer Associate Arbitration
Agreements, AM. LAW. (May 14, 2018), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/05/14/
top-law-schools-ask-firms-to-disclose-summer-associate-arbitration-agreements/, archived at
https://perma.cc/TW2E-F4WP.
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than litigation.330 When Gizmodo reached out to ten major tech companies
and asked them to get rid of their forced arbitration clauses, the request had
limited success.331 Amazon and Verizon denied using such clauses, and none
of the additional major companies agreed to get rid of the provisions.332
Given these circumstances, the #MeToo movement provides a clear,
real-time example of the individual and societal consequences of mandatory
arbitration discussed throughout this Article. By preventing historically dis-
empowered female workers from gaining access to court, many American
companies suppress their employees’ ability to pursue relief for their injuries
and prevent the development of more progressive law that might otherwise
have occurred in light of widespread social momentum.
IV. CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
So, what is to be done?
A. Congress Can Fix This
In one sense, the reform is easy. The Supreme Court’s arbitration juris-
prudence derives from one statute, the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act.333
While many, including this author334 and multiple current or former Supreme
Court Justices,335 believe the Court has grossly misinterpreted this statute, it
seems highly unlikely the Court and its newest members will change their
approach any time soon. However, the good news about errors in statutory
interpretation is that passage of new laws can fix them. To this end, over a
period of now more than sixteen years, legislators have introduced various
Arbitration Fairness Acts that would prevent companies from using form
contracts to impose arbitration on consumers and employees.336 While such
330 The last major study on the question of how many companies impose mandatory arbi-
tration on their employees was published in 2017 by Alexander Colvin and showed that 56%
of companies did so. See Colvin, Growing Use, supra note 101. While it is conceivable that R
this number might have shrunk, it is also quite possible it has risen, particularly as companies
have been reassured by the Supreme Court in Epic Systems that it is permissible to use
mandatory arbitration to insulate themselves from employment class actions. See supra notes
152–153 and accompanying text. An accurate current count of the number of companies that R
force arbitration on their employees must await new empirical research.
331 See Ehrenkranz, supra note 325. R
332 Id.
333 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
334 See Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 26, at 697; see also SZALAI, R
supra note 138; Moses, supra note 138, at 157; Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration, R
supra note 171, at 244; Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick, supra note 143, at 145. R
335 Moses, supra note 138, at 122–30 (mentioning several Supreme Court Justices who R
have taken issue with the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act).
336 Such proposals have taken various forms since the Arbitration Fairness Act was first
introduced in 2002. Sometimes such proposed statutes have also included protections for fran-
chisees or those who would present civil rights claims. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial
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Acts have varied somewhat in their details,337 they have shared the same
fate: none has been passed by, or even come close to passing, either House
of Congress.338 The Chamber of Commerce, as well as others, have firmly
resisted such legislation,339 and while Democrats have tended to be support-
ive,340 Republicans have not.341
The #MeToo movement has given energy to an effort to pass a narrower
law focused on protecting court access for victims of sexual harassment.342 A
bill entitled the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of
2017,343 was introduced in both the House and the Senate at the end of
2017.344 Significantly, the bill was sponsored not only by Democrats, such as
Senator Kristen Gillibrand, but also by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.
The key provision of the bill provides that “no predispute arbitration agree-
ment shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimi-
nation dispute.”345 The bill received a letter of support from fifty-six
Protection Bureau: Consumer Arbitration as a Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 343 (2016) (discussing policy justifications for regulating mandatory arbitration).
337 The most recent proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1374 & S. 2203, would pro-
hibit a pre-dispute arbitration agreement from being enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R.
1374, 115th Cong.
338 H.R. 1374 (introduced in Mar. 2017, only 81 cosponsors); Ending Forced Arbitration
of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (introduced in Dec. 2017, only 17
cosponsors).
339 The most recent version of the Arbitration Fairness Act has no Republican co-sponsors
in either House of Congress. Cosponsors: H.R. 1374––115th Congress (2017–2018), CON-
GRESS.GOV, http://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1374/cosponsors,
archived at https://perma.cc/S3KQ-GSBF; Cosponsors: S. 537—115th Congress (2017-2018),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/537/cosponsors,
archived at https://perma.cc/42WZ-G4Y2.
340 The Chief sponsors of this bill were Senator Al Franken and Representative Hank
Johnson.
341 Cosponsors: H.R. 1374––115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV, http://www
.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1374/cosponsors, archived at https://perma.cc/
S3KQ-GSBF; Cosponsors: S. 537—115th Congress (2017-2018), Congress.gov, https://www
.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/537/cosponsors, archived at https://perma.cc/
42WZ-G4Y2.
342 This smaller bill follows in the tradition of some other smaller bills that Congress has
passed to eliminate mandatory arbitration in particular subject areas. For example, in the wake
of the financial crisis Congress passed legislation proscribing the imposition of mandatory
arbitration with respect to consumer mortgages. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Another statute blocks
federal contractors from using mandatory arbitration provisions to prevent victims of sexual
assault from bring claims in court. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009). A third law prevents payday lenders from impos-
ing mandatory arbitration on members of the armed services. See Military Lending Act, 10
U.S.C. § 987 (2006); see also Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit Extended to Service
Members and Dependents, 80 Fed. Reg. 43560-01 (2015).
343 S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4570, 115th Cong. (2017).
344 Although the title of the bill and the lobbying on its behalf have focused specifically on
sexual harassment, in fact the bill language is somewhat broader and would protect all claims
of sex discrimination, not just those involving sexual harassment.
345 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. § 402(a).
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attorneys general—those from all fifty states and also a number of U.S. terri-
tories.346 The letter stated:
While there may be benefits to arbitration provisions in other con-
texts, they do not extend to sexual harassment claims . . . . Ending
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims would help to
put a stop to the culture of silence that protects perpetrators at the
cost of their victims.347
This legislation has also received support from many other advocates and
organizations.348 Nonetheless, this bill, like the Arbitration Fairness Act, has
not yet made it out of committee in either the House or Senate due to opposi-
tion from Republicans and the business community.349 With greater political
action, perhaps the Arbitration Fairness Act, or at least the narrower bill
focused on sex discrimination, will eventually be passed by Congress and
signed by a President. Such corrective legislation is critically important to
protect our progress towards greater justice.
Some may suggest that the Arbitration Fairness Act is too extreme and
that rather than proscribing mandatory employment arbitration altogether we
should simply regulate the practice, perhaps to lessen its impact on vulnera-
ble employees. While this purportedly moderate solution may initially sound
appealing, this author has explained elsewhere why it is ultimately unavail-
ing. So long as employers are imposing arbitration, they will always have an
incentive to devise a process that protects themselves at the expense of their
employees. And, even the wisest of regulators will likely not be able to solve
this problem. First, employers and their lobbyists will resist serious regula-
tion such as the elimination of class action waivers. Second, for every mean-
ingful regulation imposed, employers will likely be able to think of another
way to skew the process. And third, as a logistical matter, it is very difficult
to imagine either a government agency or private attorneys general who
could meaningfully review employer arbitration programs on an individual
346 Debra Cassens Weiss, Give Victims of Workplace Sexual Harassment Access to Courts,
56 U.S. Attorneys General Tell Congress, A.B.A. J., (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/give_victims_of_workplace_sexual_harassment_access_to_courts_56_us_at
torney, archived at https://perma.cc/SJW7-ELS7.
347 Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General to Congressional Leader-
ship, NAAG (Feb. 12, 2018), https://coag.gov/sites/default/files/contentuploads/ago/press-re-
leases/2018/03/03-14-18/finalletter-naagsexualharassmentmandatoryarbitration1.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/S8LV-Z8ZG. The bill has also been supported by Microsoft. See supra note
326. R
348 See, e.g., Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law & Policy, The Facts on Forced
Arbitration: How Forced Arbitration Harms America’s Workers, http://employeerightsadvo-
cacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/The-Institute-Faces-of-Forced-Arbitration-Sexual-Har-
assment-Fact-Sheet.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/LU6H-626U (“The time has come to
shine a light on workplace sexual harassment and drive offenders out of the shadows. So long
as courts embrace forced arbitration clauses and endorse class and collective action bans, per-
vasive workplace sexual harassment will continue to go unchecked . . . . Tell Congress to end
forced arbitration in the American workplace today.”).
349 Supra note 338.
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basis. In short, while it may sound appealing to solve the mandatory employ-
ment arbitration problem through regulation rather than through elimination,
upon reflection, regulation proves to be quite infeasible.350
B. Alternatives to Federal Legislation
If Congress fails to pass legislation proscribing the use of mandatory
arbitration in the employment setting, it will be very difficult to protect em-
ployees’ interest in justice and to ensure that employment law can continue
to evolve.351 Although one might reasonably believe that individual states
could pass laws to protect their employees from forced arbitration,352 the
Supreme Court has made it clear that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
most state legislation in this area. In a controversial series of decisions, the
Court has proclaimed repeatedly that states cannot legislate to undermine the
viability of arbitration “agreements.”353 Nonetheless, mandatory arbitration
opponents have tried to develop legislation states could pass that would not
be deemed preempted.354 However, states have been reluctant to adopt such
legislation,355 so whether it would pass the Supreme Court’s preemption test
remains to be seen.
A second alternative to federal legislation is federal administrative reg-
ulation. For a short time under President Obama, various federal agencies
were on a path to rein in mandatory arbitration in particular contexts.356 Aca-
350 See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 26, at 1353–54. R
351 Some commentators are more optimistic than this author that states or federal adminis-
trative agencies might step in to defeat the use of mandatory arbitration in the employment
setting. See Garden, supra note 120, at 226–32 (discussing possible regulation by federal agen- R
cies and possible use of representative suits like California’s Private Attorney General Act);
Nunez, supra note 276, at 510–12 (discussing proposed Model State Consumer and Employee R
Justice Enforcement Act).
352 See generally Heather K. Gerken & Joshua Revesz, Progressive Federalism: A User’s
Guide, DEMOCRACY: A J. OF IDEAS, Spring 2017, No. 44 (urging that substantial progressive
change can be accomplished at the state level).
353 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269 (1995) (holding an
Alabama statute proscribing enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was pre-
empted); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (holding that Montana stat-
ute requiring arbitration clauses in franchise contracts “be typed in underlined capital letters
on the first page of the contract” was preempted because provision applied only to arbitration
agreements).
354 See MODEL STATE CONSUMER & EMP. JUSTICE ACT (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. 2015);
David Seligman, The National Consumer Law Center’s Model State Consumer and Employee
Justice Enforcement Act: Protecting Consumers, Employees, and States from the Harms of
Forced Arbitration Through State-Level Reforms, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 58, 63 (2016).
355 California passed a law of this sort a couple years ago but the Governor refused to sign
it into legislation. Edward Lozowicki, Governor Brown Vetoes California Bill Prohibiting Ar-
bitration of Employment Claims, A.B.A. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/committees/alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2016/gvr-brown-vetoes-ca-bill-
prohibiting-arbitration-employment-claims.html, archived at https://perma.cc/JC8E-T4HL.
356 The best known of these efforts was the regulation almost adopted by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, which would have prevented companies from using arbitration
clauses to eliminate financial consumers’ opportunity to participate in class actions. The CFPB
had put such a proposed notice out for public comment and was poised to adopt the rule, but
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demics were excited about the possibilities,357 which might have extended to
employment. However, in the current political climate it no longer seems
imminent that any federal agency will seek to limit companies’ use of forced
arbitration. To the contrary, several efforts that were far underway were re-
versed by the Trump administration in fairly short order.358
In sum, while a federal legislative “fix” for mandatory arbitration does
not appear to be imminent, it nonetheless is clear that Congress is our last
best hope for restoring employees’ access to court and protecting the contin-
ued evolution of employment law.
CONCLUSION
There are many good reasons to critique mandatory employment arbi-
tration. This author has been challenging courts’ acceptance of mandatory
arbitration for more than twenty years on a variety of policy and Constitu-
tional grounds. As previously explained, companies’ use of mandatory arbi-
tration harms individual employees, and also harms the larger public.
This Article offers a critique of the practice of mandatory employment
arbitration from a fresh perspective. While employment arbitration hurts all
employees, it particularly harms the most vulnerable members of our
workforce. Social movements may galvanize support for individuals who, on
their own, are politically and economically disempowered.359 Courts can
play a key role in converting the momentum of social activism into mean-
ingful legal change. But in order to do so, claims need to get through the
courthouse door. As we are witnessing in real-time with #MeToo, mandatory
arbitration prevents employees from bringing claims in court, thereby block-
ing judges from considering evolving social mores when reviewing older
then President Trump’s appointees pulled the proposed regulation. Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals
Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Banker Praise, THE HILL (Nov. 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/
policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-
banking, archived at https://perma.cc/7CT7-73KS.
357 See, e.g., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 988 (2017);
Daniel Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2017); Sternlight, Hur-
rah, supra note 336, at 375 (discussing various agencies’ efforts to limit or eliminate R
mandatory arbitration in areas such as consumer finance, education, and medical care).
358 Julia Horowitz, Trump Kills Rule That Made It Easier for People to Sue Banks, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 1, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/01/news/trump-repeals-cfpb-arbitra-
tion-rule/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/E749-PG4X; Mark Kantor, Department of
Education Suspends Arbitration Regulation, A.B.A. (July 7, 2017), https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/litigation/committees/alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2017/department-of-
education-suspends-arbitration-regulation.html, archived at https://perma.cc/S99L-ZZS6; Rob-
ert Pear, Trump Moves to Impede Consumer Lawsuits Against Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/us/politics/trump-impedes-consumer-
lawsuits-against-nursing-homes-deregulation.html, archived at https://perma.cc/QR54-K7JQ.
359 Of course, as has been noted, social movements may also sometimes go in an anti-
progressive direction––limiting abortion, attacking immigration, and advocating gun rights.
See Guinier & Torres, supra note 3. While the progressive trend is not inevitable, the point of R
the Article is that it will be impeded by mandatory arbitration that denies access to courts.
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legislation. In this way, mandatory arbitration is stymying the very evolution
of law.
By focusing on #MeToo as well as the numerous empirical studies un-
dertaken in this area, we can see that mandatory arbitration does not provide
a viable alternative to court. Individual arbitrators may be progressive and
willing to respond to new ways of thinking, but it is not realistic to rely on
arbitrators to issue the next groundbreaking decisions expanding the rights
of transgender persons, victims of sexual harassment, or any other vulnera-
ble group. These issues will rarely make their way to arbitration due to the
plethora of hurdles in complainants’ ways. And even if they do, arbitrators
are far less likely than judges to issue creative and forward-thinking interpre-
tations of existing laws. That has not been and likely will never be the role of
arbitrators, who by the nature of the job are more cautious and incentive-
driven. Moreover, even if an arbitrator were to issue a bold decision, it
would be seen by few and have little if any impact on the further develop-
ment of the law.
For those who believe that the arc of the moral universe bends towards
justice, mandatory arbitration is demolishing that arc. Therefore, those who
care about the most vulnerable members of our society must continue to call
upon Congress to pass legislation to eliminate the use of mandatory arbitra-
tion.360 Only in this way can we hope to ensure that that social movements
and courts continue to reinforce one another and thereby keep our moral
universe progressing towards justice.
360 While this Article has focused on the use of mandatory arbitration in the employment
context, its use in consumer and other settings has a similar impact, undercutting progressive
legal developments. So, the conclusion calls for elimination of mandatory arbitration generally
rather than only in the employment context.
